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INTRODUCTION 
The most effective means of conducting research, development and innovation (hereinafter 
RDI) could be through successful university-business cooperation in research and 
development (hereinafter UBC in R&D). Nevertheless, UBC in R&D is too often considered 
a narrow research topic. This is despite the fact that the challenge to significantly improve 
RDI has now become the focal point of growth-seeking European economies. 
The latter is especially true for small catching up economies like Estonia, which in order to 
complete their convergence, must grow even faster. Some neoliberals might argue that “a 
unique and globally stable growth path exists to which the level of labour productivity and 
income per person will converge” (Veugelers, Mrak 2009: 3). However, forces behind 
economic growth are more complex than the neoclassical theories depict, and convergence 
does not occur simply due to some anonymous reasons. 
Instead, as it has been proven by the Schumpeterian semi-endogenous growth model, the 
economies’ absorptive capacity to produce and commercialize intellectual capital has a 
substantial impact on economic growth (Cohen, Levinthal 1990). Specifically, states that 
manage to improve their internal RDI also improve their outlook for economic growth. More 
importantly, catching up economies (including Estonia) that resolve this challenge, will 
develop a strong endogenous growth. 
The latter is especially important for avoiding the middle-income trap that is a considerable 
risk for catching up economies. While the mainstream economics has discussed this concept 
for quite some time, Eichengreen et al (2013: 3) have drawn particular attention to the 
importance of technology development for avoiding the risk of stagnation in the range of 
$15 000 – $16 000 per capita GDP. In the case of Estonia, as its current per capita GDP for 
2013 in current USD was approximately $18 896 (Statistikaamet 2014), it is already 
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somewhat above the range of a potential middle-income trap as specified by Eichengreen et 
al (2013). Nevertheless, without developing a strong internal growth driver, resolving the 
challenge of catching up with the developed economies is unlikely. 
Such challenges are independent for each state, just as for each firm and university. Although 
lessons can be drawn from developed economies, the paths cannot be directly copied. 
Furthermore, it must be clearly recognised that the businesses of catching up economies do 
not have the necessary finances, not to mention the necessary expertise, to independently 
invest into RDI (Staehr et al 2010). However, on the macroeconomic scale, especially during 
later growth stages, without increasing RDI intensity, it becomes impossible to complete the 
convergence (Ibid). UBC in R&D, particularly, could be one of the most resource effective 
paths to successfully improve the RDI intensity. 
Herein, successful UBC in R&D is not relevant solely for small catching up economies. On 
the contrary, most of the developed economies puzzle over the very same challenge (Mower, 
Sampat 2005; Koschatzky, Thomas 2010; Knuuttila 2012; Fukugawa 2013). Nevertheless, 
as long as the status quo persists, UBC in R&D as a resource effective opportunity to 
revitalize sustainable economic growth remains overlooked. If, however, small catching up 
economies were to fully utilize the potential of successful UBC in R&D, a significant 
endogenous growth driver could be generated to complete the long-lasting convergence that 
would otherwise be stopped by a middle-income trap. 
Also, UBC in R&D is not the single existing path towards improved RDI. Several other 
alternatives, such as companies’ internal R&D activities; cooperation with specific think-
tanks; consultancies; etc., could also function as paths towards intellectual capital production 
(Laursen, Salter 2004). Yet, UBC in R&D has the advantage of producing knowledge most 
resource effectively: “Collaboration provides companies with the means by which to advance 
technologically, at lower cost and with less inherent risk. [...] For universities, the benefits 
include additional public and private funding, and increasingly, licensing, and patenting 
income” (Barnes et al 2002: 2). 
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On the level of political statements, the European discourse seems to agree. First of all, the 
EU admits its need to urgently improve the “ability to convert knowledge into commercial 
ventures that yield economic benefit.” (Goldstein et al 2011: 1) Secondly, stimulating the 
endogenous growth drivers (such as RDI through UBC in R&D) has been proven to work in 
the East Asian miracle economies of Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea (Ang, 
Madses 2009). Thirdly, the high potential that UBC in R&D poses for Estonia has been 
recognised by most of the recent research on the state innovation systems (Seppo, Roolaht 
2012; Varblane et al 2012; Laine, Varblane 2010). 
Regardless, despite the widespread recognition of UBC in R&D as potentially a significant 
contributor to RDI, Estonia is still far from employing its full potential (WEF 2012). 
Moreover, as shown above, there lacks a clear-cut understanding for how to indeed enhance 
such collaboration. Therefore, the central goal of this thesis is to analyse the current state of 
Estonian UBC in R&D and provide recommendations for enhancement.  
In order to meet the central goal, the following research objectives were formulated: 
 analyse the key processes of UBC in R&D from a state perspective; 
 analyse, what drives successful UBC in R&D; 
 consider possible methods used to assess the current state of UBC in R&D; 
 analyse the Estonian RDI system and specify the research methodology and sample; 
 analyse the current state of Estonian UBC in R&D; 
 provide policy recommendations to enhance Estonian UBC in R&D. 
The research method builds on case studies at which particular collaboration projects were 
observed from both the university as well as business perspectives. The information was 
gathered via semi-structured face-to-face interviews that were independently carried out with 
the university and business representatives for each of the observed cases. In total, eight UBC 
cases in R&D were investigated. A similar approach for analysing the Estonian UBC was 
recently used by Vadi and Rajalo (2013). They also conducted semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews with business and university representatives. Nevertheless, differently from the 
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beforehand thesis, their approach did not involve both collaborating parties from the same 
projects, and they did not explicitly focus on success drivers for UBC in R&D. 
While conducting the analysis within the theory sub-chapters, earlier research on the 
evolution of RDI as well as specifically UBC in R&D was thoroughly studied. The core 
framework was constructed based on the Triple Helix theory by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
(2000), whereas the process description of UBC in R&D was primarily inspired by Perkman 
et al (2011). In addition, the best practice model of UBC by Barnes et al (2002) along with 
the collaboration drivers by Davey et al (2011) were used as the primary input for defining 
the key success drivers of UBC in R&D. In order to define the possible assessment 
methodologies for UBC in R&D, a combination of earlier research findings was used: e.g. 
the literature review by Piva and Rossi-Lamastra (2013); a success map of UBC in R&D by 
Perkmann et al (2011); etc. With regard to the recent theoretical findings on the Estonian 
UBC in R&D, particularly, the research conducted by Varblane, Kattel, Masso and others 
was used as basis (e.g. Varblane et al 2012; Kattel et al 2012; Masso et al 2013; etc). 
The thesis is structured as follows: first, a framework for analysing UBC in R&D is 
constructed based on the synthesis of available literature. Secondly, drivers identified by 
earlier research that possibly contribute to successful UBC in R&D are defined. Thirdly, an 
overview of the possible methodologies to assess the current state of UBC in R&D is 
provided. Fourth, the research methodology and the sample are being elaborated, followed 
by analysis on whether the Estonian UBC projects in R&D generally employ these drivers to 
successfully reach their initial goals. Lastly, policy recommendations to stimulate the 
Estonian UBC in R&D as a potentially strong endogenous growth driver are being discussed. 
The author would like to express sincere gratitude to the interviewees that provided their 
much valued input (Margus Sirel from Elektrilevi OÜ; Prof. Juhan Valtin from the Tallinn 
University of Technology; Richard Murutar from BoatArt OÜ; Tuuli Trei from the Estonian 
Academy of Arts; Maria Voznesenskaya from VTT-NTM OÜ; Aarne Kasikov from the 
University of Tartu; Marek Koit from Üle OÜ; Kristian Sülluste from KBFI; Mare Reiman 
from Tere AS; Jane Saatre from the University of Tartu; Kaspar Ratnik from Quattromed 
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HTI Laborid OÜ; Prof. Maris Laan from the University of Tartu; Karin Kustavus from 
Põltsamaa Felix AS; Andero Uusberg from the University of Tartu; Andres Mellik from 
JukuLab OÜ; Marek Link from the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences; Emöke 
Sogenbits and Sixten Kerge from Eolane Tallinn AS; Jaan Viru from CrystalSpace OÜ). 
In addition, the author would like to express his gratitude to the thesis advisor Jaan Masso, 
whose insights have been highly valuable along with the explicit comments and feedback. 
Last, but not least, the greatest gratitude goes to my always helpful wife Kaisa, and our newly 
born son Uku. 
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1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNIVERSITY-BUSINESS 
COOPERATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
1.1 Key processes of university-business collaboration in 
research and development 
A framework to analyse UBC in R&D can be constructed through defining the key phases of 
the cooperation process. Also, since UBC in R&D functions as an iterative process, the 
process should be viewed in a cyclical nature. Thus, the author constructs the process cycle 
of UBC in R&D. This foremost builds on the approaches of Perkman et al (2011) and 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000). The first of the two proposes that in order to assess UBC 
in R&D, the stages of cooperation, including inputs, in-process activities, outputs and 
impacts are ought to be clearly understood. The latter generates a broadly accepted stepping 
stone for understanding the state level evolution of UBC in R&D. 
Before proceeding, although Perkman et al (2011) are instrumental to structure the process 
of UBC in R&D, their low level framework focuses on project management, and excludes 
the high level macroeconomic motivation for UBC in R&D. First, they do not include 
explanations for the underlying demand for RDI; and secondly, their approach does not 
explicitly consider the mechanism of how UBC in R&D as specific form of RDI eventually 
contributes to economic growth. Yet, a state level framework that observes UBC in R&D as 
a significant endogenous growth driver, must include these aspects. Therefore, market 
demand for RDI is included as a starting phase; and the commercial benefits of UBC in R&D 
are added as an ending phase to the cycle of UBC in R&D. In short, all of the phases are 
defined as follows: 
 Preliminary phase: formation of the need for RDI. 
 Input phase: semi-formal university-business interactions. 
10 
 
 In-process phase: formal execution of UBC in R&D. 
 Output phase: achievement of end results of UBC in R&D. 
 Impact phase: commercial benefits that contribute to economic growth. 
First, regarding the preliminary phase, the formation of an economy’s need for RDI is ought 
to be understood. This will enable to define the significance of UBC in R&D in the context 
of a state level innovation system. Early studies assumed that the evolution of innovation is 
linear (Tunzelmann et al 2008); and the raison-d’etre for intellectual capital production is 
the emergence of new knowledge. Hence, also known as the science-push paradigm, the early 
linear innovation theories assumed that the emergence of new knowledge also feeds the need 
for intellectual capital production (Bush 1945). 
However, although the science push approach might explain the underlying motivation 
behind basic research, it fails to account that applied research, including commercial 
applications, are an outcome rather than a driver of knowledge production. Thus, the 
reasoning for RDI cannot solely be described by science-push. Instead, the market need 
behind commercial applications should receive the foremost attention. Later theories have 
tried to account for this by replacing the science-push assumption with a market pull concept 
(Tunzelmann et al 2008). Although it is a step closer to understanding the preliminary stage 
of applied research (formation of the need for RDI), it still fails to acknowledge that the 
evolution of applied science, and thereof innovation, follows non-linear patterns. 
In fact, because economies are not destined to grow by default, it is an oversimplification to 
assume that the need for RDI evolves in a linear fashion. In reality, catching up economies 
increasingly depend on the asymmetries of complex innovation systems. The latter in turn 
depends on the absorptive capacities of each individual economy. This capacity must be 
developed separately by each state. Its impact on economic growth cannot be fast-tracked 
similarly to stimulating the impact of some external measures (e.g. foreign aid, foreign capital 
investments, implementation of new technologies developed abroad, etc). 
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For businesses, universities and other actors, it is one of the very few functional methods to 
generate internal resources and skills for developing commercial applications. That is why 
convergence in terms of knowledge and skills “is a much slower and complex process than 
converging in terms of GDP measures.” (Veuglers, Mrak 2009: 1) These issues, however, 
are not addressed by the linear models of innovation, regardless of whether they follow the 
science-push or market pull paradigms. 
On the other hand, the Triple Helix theory by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) has 
internalized the asymmetries of innovation systems, and it therefore helps to explain the 
dynamics of RDI with respect to the related counterparties (academia, industry, and state). 
To understand these dynamics in full detail, “one needs to transform the sociological theories 
of institutional retention, re-combinatorial innovation, and reflexive controls” (Ibid: 112). 
The latter clearly goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the puzzles and challenges 
that each of the growth seeking economies are facing, can still be analysed. Out of such 
analysis, an understanding of the economy’s need for applied research (intellectual capital) 
via UBC in R&D can become formulated. 
Foremost, the capacity to formulate such an understanding depends on which stage of Triple 
Helix an economy stands in. There can be three possible stages: phase one (Triple Helix I) 
represents the separation of university, industry and state. This is commonly found in 
developing, and mostly authoritarian economies that have a low absorptive capacity for 
intellectual capital. A second phase (Triple Helix II), often inherent to catching up 
economies, represents the laissez fare approach to UBC. In this phase, although there are no 
obstacles to industry-state interactions, there are also no enabling mechanisms to enhance 
UBC in R&D. The latter implies that the absorptive capacity of intellectual capital still 
remains low, and therefore, the potential of UBC in R&D as an endogenous growth driver is 
under-used (Ang, Madsen 2009). Currently, as elaborated in Chapter 2.1, Estonia is still in 
this stage. 
A third stage (Triple Helix III) stands for tri-lateral networks and hybrid organisations in 
which there are little to no barriers for university-state-industry interactions, and the synergy 
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potential of UBC in R&D can become exploited at full extent. Economies that operate closer 
to Triple Helix III can formulate these understandings in a quicker and more explicit manner. 
This will in turn shorten the cycle of intellectual capital production, since the absorptive 
capacity is maximized for all market participants, and the time to enter into clearly specified 
collaboration agreements is significantly shortened. Thus, in conclusion, to set the stage for 
a successful preliminary phase of UBC in R&D, economies should thrive to enter Triple 
Helix III (see also Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1. Interconnections between the absorptive capacity of universities and businesses, 
Triple Helix phases, and the potential of UBC in R&D for RDI (Source: Constructed by the 
author based on Etzkowitz, Leydesdorff, 2000; and Schumpeter 1934). 
Within the Input phase of UBC in R&D, the specific need for intellectual capital production 
has already been formulated, and now partnerships are created to meet the respective need. 
This includes both numerous unofficial interactions as well as possible preliminary studies / 
feasibility analyses conducted prior to entering into full-scale cooperation (thus the term 
semi-formal university-business interaction). The Triple Helix framework by Etzkowitz and 
Leydersdorff again provides a good basis for understanding the high level prerequisites that 
set the conditions for a successful Input phase. 
Theoretically, economies that lag in Triple Helix I have the smallest likelihood of formulating 
any constructive partnerships between universities and businesses. This also implies that such 
economies lack the opportunity of utilizing UBC in R&D as a potentially strong endogenous 
growth driver. The lack of interactions on the axis of state-industry-academia simply work 
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against the latter. Herein, the former states of the Soviet Union are still dealing with the 
consequences of long-term stagnation in Triple Helix I, which might also explain why the 
Eastern European UBC in R&D for a rather long period had a rather low contribution to 
intellectual capital production (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 111). 
By now, although most of these economies have managed to enter at least into Triple Helix 
II (the laissez fare approach), this stage is still not characterized by strong semi-formal 
university-industry interactions, and simultaneously maximize the capacity of running 
successful UBC projects in R&D. On the other hand, economies that have reached some sort 
of Triple Helix III are clearly in a better position to formulate functional university-business 
partnerships. This is due to their intertwined nature of universities and/or businesses, which 
enables to utilize cross-organisational tacit knowledge, and to swiftly consider the 
possibilities of formulating partnerships for specific UBC projects in R&D. 
To further understand the dynamics of the Input stage, states’ levels of economic 
development should be compared. For example, in advanced countries, university-industry 
links tend to be varied as the patterns of UBC in R&D have already become formalised. At 
the same time, in catching up economies, university-industry links become more intense only 
after UBC in R&D has already become formalised (Campos 2009). The latter suggests that 
university-industry links cannot independently intensify within a laissez fare environment 
(Triple Helix II), which as discussed above, for a long time was the case for Estonia and other 
Eastern European catching up economies. To overcome this challenge, some state 
intervention mechanisms in which public incentives are generated to conduct UBC in R&D 
should likely be considered (Varblane et al 2012). 
In addition, there are several low-level determinants that are also relevant within the Input 
phase. Universities and businesses need to be independently motivated to engage in these 
semi-formal interactions. From the business’ perspective, there needs to be a clear 
understanding of the expected benefits. For example, pharmaceuticals such as 
GlaxoSmithKline and Novartis “access knowledge to gain deep expertise in specific disease 
areas;” Rolls Royce receives academic expertise in aerodynamics and system software 
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engineering; etc (Perkman et al 2011: 202). Thus, to improve the motivation to enter into 
cooperation, businesses as well as universities need a clear overview of the possible benefits 
that could be received from entering into formal collaboration. 
The In-process phase will follow after the semi-formal university-business interactions have 
been successful and partnerships have indeed been formulated. This is the phase at which 
formal execution of UBC in R&D occurs, and thus, most of its significant denominators are 
rather low level. Herein, collaboration could be carried out in several forms. For example, 
Campos (2010) specifies three mechanisms: training of human resources; social networks 
and informal contracts; and contractual arrangements. The first mechanism captures that 
universities are the training ground for highly skilled labour. In many cases, this mechanism 
still represents the most common means of university-business collaboration (Schartinger 
2001). The second mechanism is used for informal queries and spontaneous discussions; and 
the third mechanism, contractual arrangements, stands for large-scale cooperation projects. 
In the context of UBC in R&D as a form of intellectual capital production, the In-process 
phase stands for the third mechanism: Contractual arrangements (see also Table 1 below). 
Table 1. Three mechanisms of university-business cooperation 
Collaboration 
mechanisms 
Scope of university-
business cooperation 
Specification 
UBC 
mechanism 1  
Training of human 
resources 
A fraction of all human resources are trained in 
universities and hired by industry, where they 
make use of the knowledge and skills learned in 
universities. 
UBC 
mechanism 2 
Social networks and 
informal contracts 
Resolutions to trivial queries are resolved 
informally, before triggering joint-research. In this 
mechanism, economic incentives are less 
important. 
UBC 
mechanism 3 
Contractual 
arrangements 
Includes, but not limited to consultancy, joint-
research, technology licensing and the creation of 
spin-off companies. Economic incentives have a 
central importance. 
Source: Campos 2010. 
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Several factors determine, which projects will likely proceed to collaborate within the In-
process phase. Perhaps most importantly, companies and universities willing to engage in 
Open Innovation practices are more prone to UBC in R&D. Open Innovation “is a paradigm 
that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal 
and external paths to market, as they look to advance.” (Chesbrough 2006: 4) It means that 
organisations that are looking to produce intellectual capital via UBC in R&D are ought to 
view R&D as an open system rather than performing in-house research behind closed doors. 
Clearly, economies that are closer to Triple Helix III will be better equipped to indeed 
successfully enter and complete the In-process phase. Even the largest and most advanced 
businesses now face the inevitable need of collaborating with external knowledge sources. 
For example, Cisco as one of the largest and most innovative ICT companies conducts very 
little in-house R&D, whereas there are vast numbers of projects performed via external 
knowledge sources. IBM was at one point the World’s eighth largest holder of biotechnology 
patents, although it clearly operates mainly in ICT- the latter indicates, that companies with 
primary focuses in other fields can employ the benefits of cooperation in several other 
industry verticals. As a more explicit example for Estonia, large companies from small 
economies such as ABB and Novartis from Switzerland, and Philips in the Netherlands “were 
pioneers in R&D internationalization” with the clear motivation of producing intellectual 
capital through Open Innovation (Gassmann 2006: 225). 
Thus, conclusively, while considering the In-process phase of intellectual capital production 
via UBC in R&D, its greatest strength relates to the fact that businesses can access knowledge 
that can indeed eventually become commercialized in a resource effective manner. 
Nevertheless, within Estonia that at best is lagging in Triple Helix II, the fundamental 
problem is that only a handful of businesses and universities currently enter contractual 
arrangements (see also Chapter 2.1). Some of the reasoning relates to the historic implications 
of the Soviet Union. However, numerous other drivers determine whether the In-process 
phase can be reached and successfully completed. These drivers are defined in Chapter 1.2. 
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Regarding the Output phase, despite vast literature on university-business cooperation, there 
is no clear-cut definition for what exactly constitutes a successful output of UBC in R&D.  
On the one hand, it is clear that for businesses, intellectual capital production needs to result 
in commercial benefits. Nevertheless, it is not clear at all, whether and at which point will 
UBC in R&D indeed deliver these results. Often, UBC in R&D might simply result in a new 
kind of knowledge, which has little explicit connection with commercialization. Depending 
on the definition, the latter may be considered a successful result. Nevertheless, without 
commercial impacts, a successful UBC project in R&D has no contribution to economic 
growth. (Laursen, Salter 2004) 
The latter is somewhat counterintuitive, because according to widespread assumptions, 
successful intellectual capital production will by default contribute to economic growth 
(Arundel, Geuna 2003; Fontana et al 2006, Davey et al 2011; Ukrainski 2008; WEF 2012; 
Knowledge-Based Estonia 2006). However, UBCs’ contributions to fundamental knowledge 
could arguably be considered as an example of successful UBC, despite little commercial 
benefits. Also, from the perspective of academic integrity, it is not clear, whether strictly 
economic measures are correct to determine the success of universities’ contributions in a 
cooperation project (Bergman 2009; Kuuttila 2012). Hence, the question remains: how to 
define a successful outcome of intellectual capital production via UBC in R&D, and in which 
cases will successful UBC in R&D result in commercial benefits? 
For an explicit answer, the author finds it necessary to delineate between an output of UBC 
in R&D, and the subsequent impact. The output phase strictly determines whether the goal(s) 
of UBC projects in R&D have been achieved. These goals are defined on project-specific 
basis by the contractual arrangements between collaborators. Hence, the Output phase is 
successfully reached, if the cooperation terms rather than commercial objectives have been 
met. For example, Perkman et al (2011) define the Output phase as the point at which new 
technologies have been developed, new scientific knowledge has been formulated, and/or the 
project team has achieved a new set of skills. 
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These results may or may not include commercial outcomes. Also, for individual UBC 
projects in R&D, these outputs may indeed imply that the cooperation has been successful. 
Nevertheless, from a state level perspective, to assess the success of intellectual capital 
production via UBC in R&D, the commercial impact is also ought to be considered. 
Therefore, proceeding from the Output phase, an Impact phase shortly follows. Under this 
framework, successful intellectual capital production via UBC in R&D should include a 
clear-cut commercial impact, or an explicit outlook to reach such benefits as a result of 
collaboration. Such impacts may occur in the form of increased revenue or improved 
profitability of the firms and universities that are related to the cooperation. Also, within the 
cycle of intellectual capital production via UBC in R&D, the assumption is inherent to any 
collaboration project, regardless of whether the collaborating parties themselves knowingly 
seek these impacts. 
On the first sight, this might seem like self-evident. Indeed, under the circumstances in which 
private enterprises are financing most of the UBC in R&D, it might be self-explanatory that 
clear-cut commercial impacts are expected from a collaboration project. Nevertheless, in 
cases where public financing is involved with UBC projects in R&D, the commercial benefits 
are not always granted. For example, the Estonian Competition Authority’s recent 
assessment on using the Structural Funds for supporting the businesses concludes that most 
of the support has not reached the intended impacts, although the project outcomes have 
mostly been reported successful. (Riigikontroll 2013) The latter implies that projects tended 
not to have the goal of commercialisation linked to its explicit outcome objectives. Thus, it 
became possible to classify projects as successful, even if commercial impacts were not 
reached. 
Along the same lines, several large corporations might have the risk of conducting external 
research projects simply due to the decision of engaging in external R&D cooperation 
(Laursen, Salter 2006). In other words, cooperation could occur for the sake of cooperation 
itself. Thus, to avoid these risks, the Impact phase should be separately scrutinized, and the 
drivers relevant for maximizing the commercial benefits of intellectual capital production via 
UBC in R&D should be better understood. In that regard, Chapter 1.2 will define some of 
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the most important drivers, whereas Chapter 1.3 will discuss on the methods to assess these 
drivers from high and low level perspectives. 
 
Figure 2. The five key phases for UBC in R&D (Srouce: Constructed by the author) 
In conclusion, this sub-chapter defined the five phases of UBC in R&D: preliminary phase 
(formation of the need for knowledge production); input phase (semi-formal university-
business interactions); in-process phase (formal execution of UBC in R&D); output phase 
(achievement of end results for UBC in R&D); and impact phase (commercial benefits that 
contribute to economic growth). All in all, since UBC in R&D could function as a significant 
endogenous growth driver, the better each of the phases can be completed, the more UBC in 
R&D can enervate economic growth. Thus, the following sub-chapter elaborates on the 
relevant drivers for each of the phases, whereas the third sub-chapter discusses on potential 
assessment methods. Figure 2 above captures the concept in a conclusive manner. 
1.2 Drivers of successful university-business cooperation in 
research and development 
Based on the key phases of intellectual capital production via UBC in R&D, the aim of this 
chapter is to map the drivers that support a successful completion of each respective phase. 
Focusing solely on drivers, and excluding barriers is somewhat contrary to several earlier 
studies on UBC in R&D (Mets 2009; Bruneel et al 2010; Bekkers and Freitas 2008). 
Nevertheless, some of the recent research has recognised that positive drivers for successful 
UBC in R&D are ought to be studied in greater detail, since these will eventually function as 
the primary contributors to successful collaboration (Davey et al 2011). Drivers are herein 
both the implicit as well as the explicit determinants that support the advancement of UBC 
projects into subsequent phases. 
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Figure 3. Drivers of successful UBC in R&D (constructed by the author based on 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000; Barnes et al 2002; Perkmann et al 2011). 
Within the Preliminary phase (formation of the need for RDI), the literature suggests that 
success drivers are primarily related to the existence of earlier experience with regard to UBC 
in R&D; and the economy’s absorptive capacity for intellectual capital production (Cohen, 
Levinthal 1990). With regard to experience, these drivers are relevant due to the cyclical 
nature of intellectual capital production. As some earlier projects have reached the output 
phase (end-goals within the contractual arrangements) and/or the impact phase (commercial 
benefits), this will naturally feed the counterparties’ motivation for entering into new 
collaboration projects. 
At the same time, the motivation could also be explained by the evolutionary nature of 
innovation. After a successful collaboration, it is rather obvious that the need of returning to 
another cycle of UBC in R&D will be revived. It aligns with the findings of Mohnen and 
Horeauh (2002), who conclude that companies with ongoing R&D projects and organisations 
that already have overlapping connections between universities and businesses, are more 
likely to enter into new cooperation projects. Moreover, some of the collaboration could be 
explained by the spill-overs from R&D performed in universities. Since universities are 
constantly conducting research, their findings will inevitably generate interest to apply these 
findings with commercial purposes. 
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On the other hand, earlier experience also determines, whether and what kind of institutions 
spark on R&D cooperation. For example, Jaklic et al (2008) have found that while innovative 
Slovenian businesses rarely cooperate with local universities, they have a rather high inter-
business collaboration intensity. This is due to the fact that inter-firm cooperation has been 
commercially successful, whereas UBC in R&D has not posted the same kind of success. 
The fact that earlier collaboration experience significantly increases cooperation intensity is 
also proven by the German manufacturers (Becker, Dietz 2004), although in their case, UBC 
in R&D is also rather wide-spread. However, while mapping the drivers of successful 
intellectual capital production via UBC in R&D, the German experience only verifies that 
earlier experience is clearly a significant driver within the preliminary phase. 
In addition, the absorptive capacity of collaborating parties stands for a significant success 
driver within the Preliminary phase. Particularly, companies with internal R&D departments, 
and universities that have technology transfer units, are more likely to pass the preliminary 
phase (Veugelers 1997; Tether 2002). Companies that do not have specific personnel nor the 
specific knowledge will simply lack the mechanism to process the needs for intellectual 
capital production via UBC in R&D. 
Part of a solution could be to set up a small in-house R&D department, which would then 
coordinate external R&D collaboration (Becker, Dietz 2004). Although the in-house 
department lacks resources to perform independent R&D, the driving force of intellectual 
capital production will still reside within the organisation. Such a strategy is not limited to 
small organisations. As discussed above, several large corporations (e.g. Cisco, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, IBM, etc) are opting for these strategies as well. The same 
applies for universities, which do not have to commercialise research on their own. Instead, 
during the preliminary phase (formation of the need for intellectual capital production), the 
most successful research by universities is driven in cases at which research departments are 
in contact with the external counterparts (Etzkowits, Leydesdorff 2000). Therefore, 
universities that enhance the absorptive capacity will be in a more favourable condition. 
In conclusion, the success drivers within the preliminary phase were specified as follows: 
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 absorptive capacity of universities and businesses; 
 earlier collaboration experience; 
 rate of spill-overs. 
Moving on to the input phase, despite the large potential stemming from university-business 
cooperation, the fundamental nature of these two institutions, and thus the motivation to 
cooperate, remains different. While businesses mostly aspire to generate profit, universities 
have a broader range of motivators. Aapaoja et al (2012) argue that the “firms’ motivation is 
to gain a competitive advantage and addressing business growth, whereas universities want 
to create new research and offer education.” At the same time, participating in research that 
has economic value, would be labelled as as a third mission of universities. (Ibid: 91) 
Therefore, while considering the input phase of intellectual capital production via UBC in 
R&D, the business- and university-specific drivers should first be observed separately. For 
businesses, the input phase drivers mostly relate to a reasonable outlook to resolve the 
underlying need via UBC in R&D. Specifically, motivation relates to the firms’ 
understanding of whether knowledge from universities could complement the firms’ 
“technology portfolio” (Teixeira, Costa 2006: 25). Also, according to Cohen et al (2002), 
firm size and age could herein matter. Larger firms and start-ups are more likely to enter into 
UBC in R&D. Hence, economies that have a high concentration of either of the two should 
theoretically expect a higher rate of UBC projects in R&D. 
From a slightly different angle, firms’ ability to control outflows of knowledge could have a 
unique impact on businesses’ motivation to enter into a contractual arrangement (Chun, Mun 
2011). Thus, in order to proceed with UBC in R&D, it might be particularly relevant for some 
companies to understand, whether control over IPR will remain maintained. Specifically, 
since the input phase between universities and businesses has a semi-formal nature, the 
initiation of collaboration projects may vastly depend on the parties’ trust against each-other. 
These kinds of informal contacts seem to be especially relevant in order to access tacit 
knowledge, which in many cases, stands for a decisive driver to proceed to the in-process 
phase (Arundel, Geuna 2004). Again, the latter relates back to the Triple Helix theory: 
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economies that are closer to Triple Helix III will have the closest connections between 
universities and businesses. 
To specify the university-related drivers within the input phase, first, the “entrepreneurial 
led” and “classical” universities should be distinguished. The first kind of universities are 
such that have close connections with businesses, and that are therefore more prone to engage 
in UBC in R&D. The second kind is arguably more focused on base science, and has less 
interest in commercial applications. (Teixeira, Costa 2006: 26) A similar notion is also 
captured by the theories of Mode 1: the theoretical model; versus Mode 2 universities: the 
problem-oriented and trans-disciplinary model. Although it could be argued that Mode 1 as 
well as Mode 2 universities are needed for the sake of scientific advancement (Knuuttila 
2012), it is clear that universities with Mode 2 characteristics will be more likely to complete 
the input phase of UBC in R&D. 
At the same time, since the in-process phase stands for semi-formal university-business 
interactions, it should also be noted that several academics have a propensity to engage in 
informal collaboration. For example, Link et al (2006) have found that especially more 
tenured faculty tend to engage in knowledge transfer, joint publications with industry 
scientists, and consulting via informal collaboration. Out of such collaboration, a formal in-
process phase of UBC in R&D might not follow. However, if trust between universities and 
businesses is high enough, the input phase could in theory be successful. The preference of 
such informal collaborations among some faculty could imply that there are alternative paths 
to contractual arrangements. Nevertheless, from the universities’ stand point, regardless of 
whether the input phase results in a formal UBC in R&D, it is clear that academics are ought 
to be interested in the practical application of their research. Without such interest, they will 
most likely not seek connections with businesses, and will rather work in accordance to the 
Mode 1 framework. 
In addition, some drivers to proceed from the Input phase are relevant across businesses and 
universities. Perhaps most importantly, the availability of public co-financing is clearly 
significant, especially within catching up economies. For example, Varblane et al (2012) 
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show that while clustering the European economies based on cooperation intensity, the 
countries with highest co-financing stand out in separate clusters from the countries with the 
lowest financing rates. The latter emphasises that within the catching up economies, in order 
to proceed from the input phase, it is clear that without public co-financing, there will likely 
not be sufficient funds to proceed with official collaboration projects. 
This is also supported by comparing the collaboration patterns with the availability of EU 
structural funds. In Estonia, between 2004 – 2006 and 2007 – 2013 during which the 
structural funds were available to support UBC in R&D, collaboration levels became rapidly 
intensified (Ibid). At the same time, there were no UBC financing instruments solely 
supported by the private sector. Thus, in order to support the conditions for intellectual capital 
production via UBC in R&D, policies should continue with public co-financing mechanisms. 
The latter is especially important within the input phase, since without public co-financing, 
it will be difficult to motivate universities and businesses to proceed with official 
collaboration projects, assuming these are indeed driven by the aim to reach an impact stage 
(further analysed at the later part of the chapter) 
In addition, research findings suggest that the input phase is more likely to be completed by 
companies from early stages of industries, or from industries that are under a rapid 
transformation- e.g. ICT and new materials (Campos 2010). Also, firms from knowledge-
intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemistry and energy have a greater likelihood to 
enter into formal cooperation agreements with universities. This points to the tendency of 
firms seeking formal alliances mostly in case there is yet little idea of how, exactly, could 
knowledge eventually become commercialized. The latter is explained via the outlook of 
knowledge spill-overs: as the outlook improves, it could be expected that the rate of formally 
executed UBC in R&D will also increase. (Veuglers, Cassiman 2005) 
In conclusion, the success drivers within the input phase can be specified as follows: 
 ability to combine university-business interests; 
 firm size and age; 
 trust between universities and businesses; 
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 rate of entrepreneurial (Mode 2) universities; 
 availability of public co-financing; 
 industry belonging (are the firms related to industries that operate in early stages?). 
Once UBC in R&D has entered the in-process phase, success drivers become foremost 
related to the low level relationship and business-related drivers (Davey et al 2011). The 
relationship drivers include mutual trust; commitment; a shared goal; understanding of 
common interest by different stakeholders; prior relations with the business partner; and 
cooperation as effective means to address societal challenges and issues. At the same time, 
the business drivers include employment by business of (former) Higher Education 
Institution (hereinafter HEI) staff and students; interest of business in accessing scientific 
knowledge; possibility of accessing funding / financial resources for working with business; 
short geographical distance of the HEI from the business partner; flexibility of business 
partner; access to business-sector research and development facilities; and commercial 
orientation of the HEI. Conclusively, the key drivers defined by the factor analyses of Davey 
et al (2011: 5) are outlined on the table 2 below. 
Table 2. Types and grouping of drivers 
Type of 
driver  
Explanation 
 
Relationship 
driver 
Drivers that relate to the relationship between the academic / HEI and the 
business, and these include: 
 existence of mutual trust; 
 existence of mutual commitment; 
 having a shared goal; 
 understanding of common interest by different stakeholders (e.g. HEIs, 
business, individuals, students); 
 prior relation with the business partner; 
 cooperation as effective means to address societal challenges and 
issues. 
 
Business 
drivers 
Drivers that relate to the business factors that motivate UBC, and these include: 
 employment by business of (former) HEI staff and students; 
 interest of business in accessing scientific knowledge; 
 possibility of accessing funding / financial resources for working with 
business; 
 short geographical distance of the HEI from the business partner; 
 flexibility of business partner; 
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Type of 
driver  
Explanation 
 access to business-sector research and development facilities; 
 commercial orientation of the HEI. 
Source: Davey et al 2011 
Although Davey et al have come up with a structured list, these still exclude several low-
level, yet crucial In-process drivers for successful UBC in R&D. Specifically, they overlook 
project management, which is significant for any UBC project in R&D (Perkman et al 2011). 
A more detailed approach would also observe the roles of each member of the project team 
- e.g. the role of the Lead Researcher, whose capability to take responsibility for managing 
both the research work and the activities of the researchers could become an equally 
significant success driver (Barnes et al 2002). 
Conclusively, Barnes et al (2002) identified eight categories of most significant success 
drivers (see following figure 4). While the first category (Universal factors) could apply for 
any phase of intellectual capital production via UBC in R&D, most of the other categories 
are mainly relevant within the In-process phase. Specifically, the success drivers were 
defined as follows: a) Universal drivers (trust, commitment, continuity of personnel, good 
personal relations); b) Choice of partners (no hidden agendas; prior collaborative experience, 
complementary aims, strategic importance past collaboration partner); c) Project manager 
(experienced project manager); d) Project management (clearly defined objectives, good 
progress monitoring, effective communications, clear responsibilities, good project planning, 
clear reporting & meeting structure); e) Ensuring equality (evident mutual benefit); f) 
Environmental factors (corporate stability); g) Outcomes (clear proprietary benefit, little 
proprietary benefit, tangible outcomes); h) cultural issues (agreed timescale, balanced 
priorities, student agenda, academic right to publish). (Ibid) 
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Figure 4. Key drivers for successful UBC in R&D (Source: Barnes et al 2002). 
Also, during the in-process phase, the level of organisational involvement could become 
relevant for successful UBC in R&D. From the business’ side, “without senior management 
influence, lower levels of management are unlikely to give a collaborative project the 
required degree of commitment, attention and priority” (Barnes et al 2002: 278). Moreover, 
from the universities’ side, flexibility must be left for “academic rigour” in order to comply 
with the principles of academic integrity. Nevertheless, “clearly defined objectives and a 
structured approach to decision-making” are fundamental to any successful UBC project in 
R&D (Ibid: 208). 
University-Industry Specific Issues 
Role of lead researcher; Role of post-graduate students; 
Leadership; Staff secondment 
Managing the “Culture 
Gap” 
Differing priorities / 
timescales 
Publishing in public 
domain 
Academic laissez-faire 
approach 
IPR & confidentiality 
Partner Evaluation 
Factors 
Compatibility of culture / 
mode of operation 
Mutual understanding 
Complementary expertise / 
strengths 
Past collaboration partners 
High quality staff 
Shared vision / strategic 
importance 
Complementary aims 
No hidden agendas 
Collaborative experience 
Project Manager 
Project management training 
Diplomacy 
Track record & experience  
Multi-functional experience 
Project Management 
Clearly defined objectives 
Clearly defined 
responsibilities 
Mutually agreed project plan 
Realistic aims 
Adequate resources 
Defined project milestones 
Simple collaborative 
agreement 
Regular progress monitoring 
Effective communication 
Ensuring collaborators 
deliver 
Outcomes 
Proprietary benefit 
Technological innovation 
Continued support of 
research programmes 
Papers published 
Patents / IPR 
Student projects 
Student recruitment 
Universal Success Factors 
Mutual trust; Continuity; Commitment; Learning; Flexibility; 
Leadership; Good personal relationships; Collaboration 
champion 
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The output phase will mostly be reached by all of the UBC projects in R&D that already have 
ongoing contractual arrangements. This is true, since mostly universities and businesses will 
only enter contractual arrangements with confidence in their capability to meet the terms of 
the respective contract. Therefore, with respect to the particular drivers related to the 
Outcome phase, these are foremost related to the project-specific terms. Hence, the greatest 
incentives for reaching the outcome phase relate to the counterparties’ motivation to avoid 
possible penalties in case of not fulfilling one’s duties as well as the material benefits from 
completing specific tasks. 
At the same time, the drivers related to the Impact phase are considerably more complex. On 
the one hand, this is the phase that often receives close to no attention (Seppo and Lilles 
2012). On the other hand, as emphasised above, in order to reach commercial benefits, it is 
fundamental that UBC in R&D does indeed successfully complete the impact phase. Herein, 
the most critical success driver relates to commercialisation strategies and more specifically, 
to whether such strategies indeed exist for particular UBC projects in R&D. On behalf of 
businesses, an understanding of how and what to commercialise is likely more 
straightforward. Nevertheless, for universities, the significance of a systemic approach to 
knowledge commercialisation has only recently become recognised. (Toomla 2014) 
For example, a relevant factor for the commercialisation strategy could be the existence of a 
clearly specified process for commercialising a UBC project in R&D. From the university’s 
point of view, this starts with adopting a knowledge commercialisation mission next to the 
“traditional academic missions of teaching and scientific discover.” (Meyer et al 2011: 179) 
Next, after recognising such a mission, the Valley of Death for transfer knowledge into a 
commercial application is ought to be crossed. One of the most successful methods is to have 
clearly defined processes along with critical resources and well-equipped partners for each 
respective phase of the commercialisation process. (Ibid) 
 As a result of the commercialisation process, successful spin-offs could be seen as the end-
goal (Rasmussen et al 2013). Nevertheless, for UBC projects in R&D, the final objective 
could simply be a revenue and profit sharing agreement between the collaborating parties. 
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At the same time, the critical phases that need to be successfully completed to reach such 
results, could be the same phases of UBC in R&D as outlined by this respective thesis. In 
that case, the UBC projects that become to formulate agreements within the input phase, 
should already be defining commercialisation as the primary objective of collaboration. 
Moreover, for UBC in R&D, the commercialisation strategies must account for the interest 
of both parties. Although the latter might seem rather straight-forward, it is in practice a 
difficult objective to be achieved. First of all, as shown above, universities and businesses 
themselves often find it difficult to draft strategies for a single organisation. Secondly, even 
if individual organisations manage to define their own interests with regard to R&D 
commercialisation, accounting for the interests of external organisations will introduce a 
dimension with much greater challenges. Therefore, with respect to the drivers that relate to 
the impact phase, the ability to formulate as well as execute joint commercialisation strategies 
will likely be the greatest determinant for indeed succeeding with UBC in R&D. 
In conclusion, this chapter analysed the success drivers relevant for each of the phases within 
UBC in R&D. As shown above, each phase has certain critical drivers that contribute most 
to the successful completion of a cooperation project: absorptive capacity for the preliminary 
phase; ability to match university-business interests for the input phase; project management 
related for the in-process and output phases; and commercialisation strategy related drivers 
for the impact phase. At the same time, there are a number of success drivers equally relevant 
across phases. Herein, these drivers were categorised between high level (market demand for 
RDI; regulatory incentives; macroeconomic conditions) and low level ones (university-
industry specific issues; partner evaluation factors; managing the “Culture Gap;” universal 
success factors; collaboration outcome perspectives). The following subchapter will analyse 
the possible methods to assess the current state of UBC in R&D at a state level. 
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1.3 Methods to assess university-business cooperation in 
research and development 
This sub-chapter analyses methodologies to assess the current status of intellectual capital 
production via UBC in R&D. The goal is to specify, how to perform measurements so that 
the results could be used as basis for state level policy recommendations. Although the focus 
will be on assessment methods used by earlier studies, it must be noted that despite a wide 
literature on university-business interactions, “scholars have not developed any structure and 
commonly accepted systems of indicators aimed at measuring the results of these 
collaborations” (Piva, Rossi-Lamastra 2013: 40). Hence, since there are no widely accepted 
approaches, the beforehand sub-chapter must construct a theoretical understanding for what 
then constitutes a functional assessment methodology. 
The lack of such a consensus is not unique to UBC, but rather inherent to any cooperation 
projects that include diverse “structural and institutional characteristics.” University-business 
cooperation is simply “prototypical” to latter cases. (Ibid: 41) Moreover, only recently have 
UBC in R&D indicators become a significant research topic, although any quantitative and/or 
qualitative approach still poses substantial limitations. On the one hand, quantitative methods 
require simplifications prior to reaching any applicable inferences. On the other hand, 
qualitative methods risk substantial biases due to the subjectivity of evaluations. 
Because the drivers of UBC in R&D are hardly ever numeric, the core focus of quantitative 
analysis has to rely on easily recorded output measures - e.g. number of patents or research 
expenditures (Autant-Bernard, LeSage 2011), number of financing mechanisms for UBC 
(Varblane et al 2012), number of collaboration initiatives, etc. Under a narrow framework, 
these indicators could indeed provide inferences. For example, Autant-Bernard and LeSage 
(2011) study the rate of knowledge spill-overs via spatial econometric models. For such a 
purpose, quantitative methods are surely. Also, Varblane et al (2012) have compared 
governmental support measures toward enhancing UBC in Europe. Because financing 
involves clear quantitative characteristics, it is also reasonable to employ quantitative 
assessment methods. 
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However, while assessing UBC in R&D at a state level, quantitative research could only 
observe the easily measurable nuances (as specified above, number of patents, number of 
financing mechanisms for UBC, number of collaboration initiatives, etc). A more complex 
alternative would be to derive proxies to successful UBC in R&D via subjective evaluations 
such as participants’ satisfaction with the process and outcomes. E.g. Grimaldi and von 
Tunzelmann (2002) have constructed an indicator that builds on both direct and indirect 
(future) results of alliances, whereas a qualitative indicator observes “the potential for 
commercial exploitation of patents and scientific results and the possibilities of project 
follow-ups.” (Ibid) Additionally, as Piva and Rossi-Lamastra (2013) pointed out, Grimaldi 
and von Tunzelamann introduced a third indicator: “the degree of correspondence between 
the initial objectives and the actual results achieved by the collaborative project.” The latter 
indicator, too, requires qualitative assessment methods. (Ibid: 45) 
At the same time, more recent research has derived even more complex proxies: e.g. Al-
Ashab et al (2011) developed a Balanced Scorecard based on interviews with ten British 
firms operating in different industries. While focusing on businesses and universities that 
engage in Open Innovation practices (see also Chpt 1.2), their goal was to construct a 
mechanism that would allow to quantify the success of UBC in R&D. Inspired by the 
Balanced Scorecard methodology of Norton and Kaplan, the principles were adjusted and 
explicit KPIs for UBC in R&D were developed. Nevertheless, although their approach was 
proven instrumental for businesses, they provide little evidence on whether, in fact, the 
Balanced Scorecard could also assess collaboration from the perspective of universities. 
A similar shortfall in Ashab et al (2011) methodology is noted by Piva and Rossi-Lamastra 
(2013), who alternatively argue, that the most significant contribution to generating 
evaluation mechanisms for UBC in R&D would be the Perkmann et al (2011) success map 
(see also Chapter 1.1). According to their approach, UBC in R&D may be assessed via the 
respective metrics for each phase (see also the figure 5 below - the upper part represents the 
success map; the lower part appropriate metrics). 
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Figure 5. Success map of UBC in R&D with metrics (Source: Perkman et al 2011: 208). 
Nevertheless, the metrics by Perkman et al (2011) still omit numerous drivers for UBC in 
R&D. First, as discussed in Chapter 1.1, their success map does not include the formation of 
a need for intellectual capital production; nor does it include the commercial impact as part 
of the process. Therefore, in order to assess UBC in R&D at a state level, a wider framework 
should be used with relevant drivers also observed for the latter two phases. Moreover, firms 
rarely “assess these relationships via hard performance measures” (Ibid: 203). Instead, 
qualitative nuances that are coupled with some quantitative metrics (e.g. number of partners 
that engage in cooperation throughout multiple projects) have a critical importance for 
assessing the success of UBC in R&D. 
Also, while drafting a specific methodology for state level assessments, the specific nature 
of university-business interactions should be considered. Particularly, developed economies 
that already have trilateral networks and hybrid organisations- meaning that they have 
reached Triple Helix III (see also Chpt 1.1)- will be better prepared for the kind of 
quantitative performance analysis that Perkman et al (2011) have proposed. In Triple Helix 
III, university-business interactions are well established, which in turn means that the causes 
of the economies’ poor and/or successful UBC in R&D are easier to be systematically traced. 
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For example, Fromhold-Esibith (2011) study UBC on the example of Eindhoven and Aachen 
Universities in the Nerherlands, which are both great example of academic institutions 
operating within a structured and intense network of privately established R&D units 
working side-by-side with academia. Both of the universities operate in clustered networks 
at which UBC in R&D can thrive. Also, since these networks have established concise forms 
of collaboration, it becomes much easier to model such collaboration with quantitative 
methods. 
Yet, in the case of catching up economies (e.g. Estonia) that still lag in Triple Helix II (the 
laissez fare phase), the university-industry interactions are still arbitrary, which makes it 
difficult to assess collaboration via hard performance measures. Instead, since excess 
simplifications can be avoided, qualitative methods will likely provide greater instrumental 
value. This is due to quantitative approaches will rather observe the outcome in comparison 
to some other economies, and thus provide little options to pinpoint, how to enhance UBC in 
R&D. 
The latter is supported by the earlier experience of science, technology and innovation 
(hereinafter STI) indicators, which have been under constant development starting from the 
1950s. Nowadays, comparisons regarding the STI indicators between developed, catching up 
and other developed economies are still difficult to make (Freeman, Soete 2007). Moreover, 
for catching up economies in the Eastern Europe, collapsing of the Soviet Union embarked 
a rapid “implosion” of the research system, which subsequently lead to an “involuntary 
under-development of R&D activities” (Ibid: 8). 
Therefore, in order to grasp the complexity of evolutionary innovation systems that lag in the 
earlier phases of Triple Helix, the collaboration patterns must simultaneously be observed 
from multiple perspectives, and often placed into contexts that standard indicators would not 
capture (Fromhold-Esibith 2011). To resolve such a challenge, Ramos-Vielba (2009), for 
example, observed university-industry linkages in Andalusia- a province of Spain- with the 
purpose of validating the UBC in R&D indicators for both academia as well as businesses. 
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While performing their research, they specified several overarching methodological short 
falls that most of the research on UBC tends to witness. 
First, researchers tend to solely focus on either businesses or universities. Secondly, although 
most of the empirical research is conducted on either of the two parties, conclusions are often 
still drawn for both sides. For example, research focused on firms tends to entail the following 
limitations: projects are often aimed at industries closely related to research, e.g. 
biotechnology; studies with larger samples normally adopt data pools that are not explicitly 
designed for the purpose of UBC in R&D (e.g. the Community Innovation Surveys and there 
are notable problems with heterogeneity of sources that tend to be consistent among, for 
example, the European economies, but often even contradictory to the findings of North 
America. (Ramos-Vielba et al 2009: 652) Herein, the latter does not mean that research 
cannot be conducted on UBC in R&D with the above listed disadvantages. However, if 
specific recommendations are sought for enhancing the success of UBC in R&D, these 
disadvantages will weaken the ability to provide meaningful conclusions. 
At the same time, research focusing on universities faces the short falls by traditional 
commercial indicators, which tend to be insufficient to measure “the wider spectrum of 
potentially productive contributions in universities.” Furthermore, the procedures set up by 
universities to monitor the Third Mission activities (engagement in UBC in R&D) are rarely 
homogenous, and thus, difficult to evaluate from a narrow perspective. Also, as already noted 
above, there are considerable limitation to the data regarding the input-indicators (the STI) 
of universities’ commercial R&D. (Ibid: 653) 
Hence, in order to resolve such shortfalls within the assessment of UBC in R&D, the 
framework should be widened so that research would grasp both universities and businesses. 
Specifically, “the whole spectrum of possible knowledge exchanges between the two actors 
must be observed in order to capture the rationale behind university-industry relationships 
and to determine the role they play as sources of innovation.” (Ramos-Vielba et al 2009: 654) 
This is also agreed by Davey et al (2011), who surveyed university and industry 
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representatives, and used factor analysis to detect the structure of inter-dependent 
relationships (Ibid: 651). 
While observing some of the most recent studies, it is clear that the necessity to include both 
the university as well as business perspectives has become recognised. The above mentioned 
studies by Perkman et al (2011), Davey et al (2011), Ramos-Vielba (2009) as well as Vadi 
and Rajalo (2013) are such examples. In addition, recent studies analysing the most effective 
methods of assessing UBC in R&D tend to result in similar conclusions (e.g. Piva and Rossi-
Lamastra 2013). Herein, perhaps the most instrumental studies are such that identify the 
possible indicators for assessing UBC in R&D. 
For example, Masso et al (2013) have analysed possible indicators for assessing the success 
of UBC in R&D. Herein, although these indicators have been provided as part of a wider 
analysis on possible RDI indicators, their approach is in fact rather informative due to their 
assessment of respective indicators. They divide the cooperation process into three phases- 
input, activity, and output- whereas possible evaluation indicators are identified for each 
phase. As they consider the validity, economy of usage, and the quality of usage, they 
conclude that among the input indicators, the most effective could be to observe the R&D 
expenditures of HEIs, financed by enterprises. At the same time, for the output indicators, 
the most effective would be to observe the businesses’ evaluation of the UBC in R&D. (Ibid: 
103) 
Along the same lines, Seppo and Lilles (2012) propose a similar cooperation process 
methodology. However, they argue that the focus of such indicators should be on the 
economic impact and relationship-based indicators. Specifically, they categorise the 
indicators into four groups: inputs, activities, outputs, and impacts. For the inputs, they define 
five sub-categories of key indicators (Ibid: 213): 
 resources (e.g. R&D expenditures; university’s governmental income; grants and 
contracts; industry funding; etc); 
 researchers’ capabilities (e.g. number of publications, citations, projects, patents in 
the past; etc); 
35 
 
 researchers’ motivation (e.g. number of earlier contracts for UBC in R&D; number 
of strategies in the department for UBC in R&D; etc); 
 firms’ capabilities (e.g. number of quality certificates; previous UBC in R&D; 
number of scientists; etc); 
 firms’ motivation (e.g. number of previous contracts with universities; involvement 
with the university; etc). 
In general, measuring the success at the input stage as defined by Seppo and Lilles (2012) 
relies mostly on relationship indicators. However, for the output and impact phases, assessing 
UBC in R&D relates mostly to hard numeric measures. Furthermore, explicitly with regard 
to the impact indicators, these are mostly on a macro level: e.g. GDP per capita; total factor 
productivity; number of share of high growth enterprises; share of inward FDI per GDP; 
knowledge intensity of production; etc. (Ibid: 213). While such indicators could indeed 
provide a general understanding of the current state of UBC in R&D, these will likely provide 
little explanation on the low-level impacts of specific UBC projects in R&D. A similar 
disadvantage relates to the indicators identified and validated by Masso et al (2013). 
To resolve the latter, both the university and business perspectives could be included, while 
at the same time, observing the low- and high-level indicators related to the success of UBC 
in R&D. From a state level perspective, such a methodology could enable to assess both 
whether the primary conditions are favourable towards UBC in R&D, whereas the low level 
component could provide an explicit understanding of how to enhance successful 
cooperation at a project level. On larger scales, such a hybrid assessment methodology could 
perhaps not function. Nevertheless, within small economies, or at a regional level, cases like 
the UK’s LINK scheme (Grimaldi and Tunzelmann, 2002), or the Triple Helix strategies in 
the smart cities (Lombardi et al 2011), such methodologies could certainly be considered. 
In conclusion, there clearly is no commonly accepted methodology for assessing UBC in 
R&D. Therefore, a functional methodology will likely need a separate drafting by each 
economy. Nevertheless, as analysed in this sub-chapter, several principles are still universal 
for any assessment of UBC in R&D. First, depending on the exact level of economic 
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development as well as the stage of an economy’s Triple Helix, the right combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods is ought to be used. Secondly, it is clear that the 
cooperation process is ought to be divided into phases. Third, as shown by the sub-chapter 
1.2, critical success drivers need to be supported in order to advance to the subsequent phases 
until eventually reaching the commercial benefits at the impact phase. Thus, an assessment 
of UBC in R&D would likely need to gear towards analysing the rate of success drivers 
present within a certain economy. The following chapter will outline the results of 
performing a similar assessment for the Estonian economy. 
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2. ESTONIAN UNIVERSITY-BUSINESS COOPERATION IN 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 The status of research and development in Estonia and 
specification of the research methodology  
The objective of empirical research is to find out, how to enhance the Estonian UBC in R&D. 
First, to define the broader context and the significance of UBC in R&D, the status of the 
Estonian RDI is discussed. Secondly, the empirical research methodology is specified along 
with a brief sample description. The following chapters will then describe the current state 
of the Estonian UBC in R&D, and provide policy recommendations on how to enhance UBC 
in R&D as an effective contributor to RDI. 
As elaborated in earlier chapters, the Estonian research system has faced the need to evolve 
from the Soviet era stagnation in a complete separation of universities and businesses (Triple 
Helix I) towards complete tri-lateral networks and hybrid organisations (Triple Helix III). 
Nevertheless, for quite some time now, Estonia has remained in the laissez-fare phase (Triple 
Helix II), which is still characterised by a low absorptive capacity (Laine, Varblane 2010), 
and thus little uptake of UBC in R&D. 
This is supported by the Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report (WEF 2012), which concludes 
that despite Estonia’s exceptional convergence with the developed economies in terms of the 
competitiveness indicators, its success has not yet translated into an innovative business 
culture with a high UBC intensity (WEF 2012: 24). The latter is supported by Varblane et al 
(2012), who point out that the Estonia “has a small number of cooperation measures and the 
real cooperation from firms’ side is also weaker.” (Varblane et al 2012: 1) While comparing 
Estonia to other CEE countries, Serbănică and Drăgan (2012) also confirm that the Estonian 
firms collaboration with universities is remarkably low: only 14,5% of the firms that engage 
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in technological innovation have a collaborative engagement with universities (Ibid: 838). 
Additionally, Davey et al (2011) have reported that on average, 3,9 Estonian scientists out of 
30 engage in collaboration with businesses (Ibid: 74). That clearly shows that Estonian UBC 
in R&D is currently performing poorly. 
Fortunately, local innovation experts and policymakers are gradually noticing the problem. 
A most recent example is the Estonian Research and Innovation Policy Monitoring 
Programme (TIPS Programme) that has produced a series of reports on both Estonian RDI 
in general, as well as explicitly on the need to improve UBC. For example, within the 
Assessment of the Estonian Research and Development and Innovation Strategy 2007 – 2013 
“Knowledge-Based Estonia” (hereinafter the Estonian RDI strategy) Kattel et al (2012) 
conclude that regarding basic science indicators, the Estonian universities have performed 
well, since most of the strategic goals have been achieved. Yet, the business-related goals are 
far from being achieved. (Ibid: 4) 
At the same time, while compared to most of the other catching up economies of Eastern 
Europe, Estonia’s innovation indicators are among the top improvers. For example, apart 
from other economies within the region that have remained “moderate innovators,” Estonia 
has arguably achieved the status of an “innovation follower.” Nevertheless, as depicted on 
the figure 6 below, Estonia is still a step behind of the “innovation leaders,” who operate at 
the frontier of RDI. (Truve 2013: 13) Herein, the main indicators that still hold Estonia back 
from reaching the group of “innovation leaders“ are directly related to a low level of UBC as 
well as ineffective knowledge transfer mechanisms (Kattel et al 2012). 
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Figure 6. Innovation leaders (blue); innovation followers (green); moderate innovators 
(yellow); modest innovators (orange) (Source: Truve 2013) 
Similar problems have been recognised by research conducted as part of the TIPS 
Programme. For example, the assessment of the Estonian RDI strategy for 2007 - 2013 argues 
that strong emphasis must be placed on cooperation between Estonian businesses, state 
institutions and universities. Conclusively, as shown on figure 7, the authors have outlined 
the targets for the Estonian 2014 – 2020 RDI, which explicitly places the economic effects 
of RDI at the central focus. As seen from the figure 7 below, one of the four strategic fields 
to achieve the latter goal, is “the coherency of academic, entrepreneurial and economic 
networks.” (Kattel et al 2012: 4 - 5) This is tied closely to the need for enhancing UBC in 
R&D. 
Yet, there are no commonly accepted methods to assess university-business interactions (see 
also Chapter 1.3), although as part of the TIPS Programme, efforts have been targeted 
towards developing such methods for the Estonian UBC in R&D. For example, Masso et al 
(2013) provide an elaborate discussion on which indicators should be used. In short, as also 
discussed in Chapter 1.3, there are three types of indicators: targets, inputs, and process 
indicators. The combination as well as a particular methodology for using these indicators 
depends on the individual research goals. At the same time, while they define specific 
indicators for different goals, they also point out that there are no functional indicators to 
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assess the success of UBC in R&D. Moreover, there are currently no research projects that 
would gather data on a national level to assess the success of UBC in R&D. As a potential 
solution, they argue that it could be instrumental to gather feedback from both collaborating 
parties on particular projects. (Ibid: 102) 
 
Figure 7. The recommended key goal for the Estonian RDI strategy 2014 – 2020 and 
related fields of development (Source: author’s translation based on Kattel et al 2012: 5). 
Thus, given that the goal of the beforehand thesis is to study, how to enhance the Estonian 
UBC in R&D, the research methodology focused on filling the above defined gap. Semi-
structured interviews were performed with universities and businesses on project specific 
basis independently with both collaborating parties independently. A similar approach was 
used by Vadi and Rajalo (2013), who also conducted semi-structured interviews with 
business and university representatives as part of the TIPS Programme. Nevertheless, their 
approach did not involve both collaborating parties from the same projects, and they did not 
explicitly focus on success drivers for UBC in R&D. The following will provide further 
details on the explicit research methodology used by the author. 
To detect and measure the concentration of drivers for successful UBC in Estonia, eight 
cooperation projects in R&D were closely investigated. As specified below, all of the 
observed cases represented different business verticals and if possible, different university 
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representatives so that a broad-based overview of the particular problems could be 
constructed. In addition, two companies were interviewed that were initially known to have 
performed UBC in R&D. Nevertheless, during the interviews, it was identified, that they do 
not have experience with R&D collaboration, but rather some other forms of collaboration 
that did not suit the definition. Among other results, their reasoning for not engaging in UBC 
in R&D is discussed in Chapter 2.2. 
As already specified, for each project, semi-structured interviews were conducted separately 
with both the university and business representatives. All of the projects involved strictly two 
collaborating parties: one from the business’ side, and the other from the university. To 
ensure that the perspective of all counterparties was included, cooperation projects with 
strictly two collaborating parties were investigated. The latter included two special cases.  In 
one instance, the university representatives that participated within the project were from two 
different faculties. However, they operated as a joint team with shared responsibilities. 
Therefore, they still met the definition of a single collaborating partner. In another case, the 
collaboration project involved more than two parties. However, the specific focus of the 
interviews was at a sub-project level that was limited to the two interviewed parties. 
Universities and businesses were interviewed for eight collaboration projects. In addition, 
two businesses were interviewed with an initial understanding that they both have earlier 
experience in collaborating with universities. Nevertheless, this turned out not to be the case 
(see the reasoning in Chapter 2.2). While constructing the research sample, the primary aim 
was to generate a horizontally diverse set of observations. On the one hand, it avoids sector-
specific biases; on the other hand, a horizontally diverse sample provides an overview of the 
common denominators for any UBC projects in R&D. At the same time, the objective was 
also to study as many different Estonian R&D institutes and academic organisations as 
possible so that again, broader conclusions could be drawn on Estonian UBC in R&D. 
Also, the idea was to foremost observe the cases that have reached commercial results and/or 
have a clear outlook for the latter. Although this was not achieved for all of the observed 
cases, the fact that three of the projects comply with the latter, enables to assess the entire 
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cycle of UBC in R&D up until the impact phase. Herein, Chapter 2.2 describes the respective 
findings. The table 3 below provides a brief overview of the sample. 
Table 3. Overview of the research sample 
Case 
Organisation (related field 
for businesses) 
Name of the interviewee(s) 
(Position) 
UBC project 
1.1 
VTT-NTM OÜ 
(interferometers) 
Maria Voznessenskaya (CMO) 
PDI 2 
1.2 Inst. of Physics, Univ. of Tartu Arne Kasikov (Researcher) 
2.1 Üle OÜ (road maintenance) Marek Koit (Member of Board) 
IcePreventer 
2.2 
Keemilise ja Bioloogilise 
Füüsika Instituut 
Kristian Sülluste (R&D 
coordinator) 
3.1 Tere AS (dairy production) 
Mare Reiman (Head of product 
development) 
ME-3 (probiotic 
lactic acid bacteria 
Lactobacillus fer-
mentum ME-3”) 
3.2 
Technology transfer office, 
Univ. of Tartu 
Jane Saatre (Intellectual 
Property Manager) 
4.1 
Quattromed HTI Laborid OÜ 
(biotechnology) 
Kristian Ratnik (Laboratory 
specialist) 
Happy Pregnancy 
4.2 
Instit. of Molecular and Cell 
Biology, Univ. of Tartu 
Prof. Maris Laan (Professor of  
Human Molecular Genetics) 
5.1 
Põltsamaa Felix AS (food 
manufacturing) 
Karin Kustavus (Product 
Manager) 
Survey of implicit 
associations 
5.2 
Faculty of Economics and 
Business Administration, 
Univ. of Tartu 
Andero Uusberg (Researcher) 
6.1 JukuLab OÜ (ICT) Andres Mellik (CEO) 
Language robot 
6.2 
Estonian Academy of Security 
Sciences 
Marek Link (Head of Innovative 
Learning Technology Center) 
7.1 Elektrilevi OÜ (energy) 
Margus Sirel (Head of the 
Strategic Planning Department 
for Asset Management) Smart grid 
network 
7.2 
Department of Electrical 
Power Engineering, Tallinn 
University of Technology 
Prof. Juhan Valtin (Associate 
Professor) 
8.1 BoatArt OÜ (boating) Richard Murutar (CEO) 
Cumulus design 
8.2 Estonian Academy of Arts Tuuli Trei (Project Manager) 
9.1 
Eolane Tallinn AS 
(electronics) 
Emöke Sogenbits (CEO); Sixten 
Kerge (Quality Manager) 
n/a 
10.1 
CrystalSpace OÜ (space 
satellite production) 
Jaan Viru (CEO) n/a 
Source: Constructed by the author 
With regard to the research methodology, since the goal of the thesis is to study the current 
state of the Estonian UBC in R&D and provide recommendations for enhancement, it is 
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important to first understand, what has driven the already occurring collaboration. Based on 
such understanding, it can be assessed, whether the current policy mechanisms facilitate 
favourable conditions to support these drivers. If not, the state level policies should be 
adjusted (see the discussion in Chpt 2.3) so that more projects could perform successful UBC 
in R&D. Specifically, each project was analysed in accordance with the phases of the process 
cycle of UBC in R&D (see also Chpt 1.1). 
During face-to-face interviews, each of the phases of a particular cooperation project was 
walked through (see also figure 1). To map the companies’ and universities’ positioning for 
the preliminary phase, general questions were asked on their engagement in product and/or 
service development cooperation, and engagement in earlier UBC in product/service 
development. R&D was narrowed down to product/service development in order to achieve 
an explicit focus, and also to maintain a concise focus throughout the interview sessions. 
Additionally, for studying the other four phases of UBC in R&D (input, in-process, output, 
and impact phase), it was reasonable to pinpoint specific product/service development 
projects. For each phase, questions were designed to detect, whether the success drivers that 
could theoretically be relevant (see Chapter 1.2) were also present in the observed UBC 
projects in R&D.  The same discussion was independently carried out both with the university 
as well as business representatives. 
Apart from Vadi and Rajalo (2013), perhaps one of the closest methods has been used by 
Davey et al (2011), who observed HEI (Higher Education Institutes) and business 
representatives in order to study drivers as well as barriers to successful UBC in R&D. 
However, they performed a Europe-wide survey among businesses and HEI representatives. 
The considerably wider geographical scope also prescribed the usage of other methodologies 
than face-to-face interviews. Moreover, they observed both the drivers as well as barriers to 
successful collaboration. In the current case, the focus is drawn to only the drivers of 
successful UBC in R&D (see also Chapter 1.2 for the reasoning). 
Also, neither of the latter studies performed face-to-face interviews with both collaborating 
parties explicitly from the same cooperation projects. This prevented these studies from 
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drawing in-depth conclusions on collaboration-related success drivers. Thus, this thesis 
observed eight specific cases among university and business representatives in the context of 
specific cooperation projects. In order to conduct the case-specific investigations, in depth 
face-to-face interviews were performed with both the university as well as business 
representatives for each case. Although this allows for a considerably smaller sample, and 
therefore potentially reduces validity, it also improves the level of specificity for analysing 
each cooperation project. 
It is in alignment with Piva and Rossi-Lamastra (2013), who defined three problems in 
relation to assessing the success of UBC in R&D: (a) “Firms commonly pursue multiple 
goals when they establish alliances with universities.” If both counterparties are interviewed, 
it is possible to detect the number of goals that firms have for each specific project, and based 
on these goals, it can be assessed, whether the respective projects have been successful; (b) 
“Alliances with universities pose specific problems” for businesses. These problems can best 
be identified, if both the university and business representatives have the opportunity to 
provide specific details of their cooperation projects; (c) “The outputs of university-industry 
alliances have both tangible and intangible nature,” meaning that most of the output can be 
detected by an approach that again includes both counterparts, and that can best become 
grasped via face-to-face interviews. (Ibid: 2) 
Secondly, since universities operate on fundamentally different foundations than businesses 
(see Chapter 1.2), their motivators to pursue UBC could in fact undermine the business’ side 
drivers, and vice versa. Hence, the current approach allows to detect profile-related 
contradictory viewpoints for each specific UBC project, and subsequently assess, whether 
these contradictions could be extended to UBC in general. If so, a one-side perspective could 
produce biased conclusions on what in reality drives successful UBC in R&D. 
Third, Estonia still operates in Triple Helix II (the laissez fare approach to UBC), which 
means that more flexible approaches to assessing UBC in R&D must be used in order to 
generate constructive inferences (see also Chapter 1.3). This is different from well-
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established economies at which systemic interactions have been in place for a long time, and 
therefore, more quantifiable measures can be used for assessing UBC in R&D. 
The questionnaire is divided between two sections. The first half focuses on the earlier 
defined phases of UBC in R&D, and follows the principles of open-ended content mapping 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Herein, the rationale is to collect information that in case of a 
predefined set of answers would most likely be overlooked. Moreover, in order to encourage 
the interviewee to elaborate, each of the open-ended questions uses a certain probing 
technique: either amplificatory, exploratory, explanatory, or clarificatory (Ibid: 150 - 153). 
Appendix 1 provides an overview of the questions with a specification on the probing type 
that the particular question has. 
The second part of the interview uses structured questions. These are designed to cross-check 
and further specify the answers, and at the same time, provide a more concrete indication on 
whether the drivers for successful UBC in R&D are represented. All of the drivers outlined 
within the structured part of the interview script have been identified by earlier research as 
relevant drivers for successful UBC in R&D (see also chapter 1.2). Furthermore, while 
inspired by Barth et al (2002), the drivers were divided into six categories: university-
industry specific issues; partner evaluation factors; project management; managing the 
“culture gap;” universal success factors; and outcome perspectives. 
For the universities’ side, the motivation for specific interview questions is rather the same 
as for businesses. There were only some slight adjustments to the questions so that the 
interview would be applicable to the perspective of university representatives. An overview 
of which questions have been modified within the universities’ interview script, and which 
remained unchanged, is provided in Appendix 2. 
In conclusion, this sub-chapter has shown that UBC in R&D will clearly have a central 
importance within the Estonian RDI strategy for 2020. Therefore, after providing an 
overview of the research sample and methodology, the following sub-chapter will analyse 
the currents state of the Estonian UBC in R&D based on the findings of empirical research. 
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After elaborating on the respective findings, the last sub-chapter will then provide policy 
recommendations to enhance UBC in R&D. 
2.2 The current state of the Estonian university-business 
cooperation in research and development 
The description of the Estonian UBC n R&D is built on analysing the current state of the 
drivers for successful UBC in R&D that were elaborated in Chapter 1.2. The logical sequence 
of the analysis follows the five process phases for UBC in R&D as they were defined in 
Chapter 1.1. While discussing each of the phases, a detailed overview becomes depicted on 
how the success drivers have functioned in the cases of the observed collaboration projects. 
Particularly, with regard to each phase, first the critical drivers are discussed (absorptive 
capacity, ability to match university-business interests, project management, and 
commercialisation, respectively). Then, the success drivers for all phases are observed. 
First of all, out of the eight observed projects, three have reached some sort of an impact 
phase, meaning that the cooperation has yielded commercial results (ME-3 by Tere AS and 
the Institute of Microbiology and Institute of Biochemistry of the University of Tartu; the 
implicit associations test by Põltsamaa Felix AS and the Department of Economics of the 
University of Tartu; and the language robot development by JukuLab OÜ and the Estonian 
Academy of Security Sciences). Two projects have reached the output phase, but these have 
still not had commercial results (Smart grid network development by Elektrilevi OÜ and the 
Department of Electrical Power Engineering of the Tallinn University of Technology; and 
the 3D modelling of Cumulus by BoatArt OÜ and the Estonian Academy of Arts). 
Two of the observed projects have ended in earlier phases: PDI2 by VTT-NTM OÜ and the 
Institute of Physics of the University of Tartu; and IcePreventer by Üle OÜ and KBFI. Happy 
Pregnancy project (or more specifically, the pregnancy marker test development on the 
Luminex platform) by Quattromed HTI Laborid OÜ and the Institute of Molecular and Cell 
Biology of the University of Tartu are still currently at the in-process phase. 
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In addition, there are two businesses observed (Eolane Tallinn AS and CrystalSapce OÜ) that 
were known to collaborate with universities. However, while conducting the interviews, it 
turned out that neither of the two companies have engaged in R&D cooperation with 
universities by using contractual arrangements. Their reasoning for not doing that is 
elaborated at the later part of the sub-chapter. In conclusion, the table below specifies the 
phases that each of the cases have reached. 
Table 4. Specification of the phases that each of the projects lies in 
Case Specification Phase 
Case 1 (PDI 2) PDI 2 development by VTT-NTM OÜ and the 
Institute of Physics at the University of Tartu. 
Input 
Case 2 
(IcePreventer) 
IcePreventer development by Üle OÜ and Keemilise 
ja Bioloogilise Füüsika Instituut. 
Input 
Case 3 (ME-3) ME-3 industrial implementation by Tere AS and the 
Institute of Microbiology and Institute of 
Biochemistry, Univ. of Tartu. 
Impact 
Case 4 
(HappyPregnancy) 
HappyPregnancy development by Quattromed HTI 
Laborid OÜ and the Institute of Molecular and Cell 
Biology at the University of Tartu. 
In-process 
Case 5 (Implicit 
associations) 
Implicit associations analysis by Põltsamaa Felix AS 
and the Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration. 
Impact 
Case 6 (Language 
robot) 
Language robot development by JukuLab OÜ and 
the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences. 
Impact 
Case 7 (Smart grid 
development) 
Smart grid network development by Elektrilevi OÜ 
and the Department of Electrical Power 
Engineering, Tallinn University of Technology. 
Output 
Case 8 (3D-
modelling) 
3D-modelling of the Cumulus sailboat by BoatArt 
OÜ and the Estonian Academy of Arts. 
Output 
Case 9 (EMS) Electronic Manufacturing Services development by 
Eolane Tallinn AS. 
No 
collaboration 
Case 10 (Satellite) Space satellite development by CrystalSpace. No 
collaboration 
Source: Constructed by the author 
With regard to the preliminary phase, the observed cases provided little additional 
information in comparison to what is currently known with regard to the Estonian UBC in 
R&D. This was expected, since the formation of the need for RDI occurs on a national level, 
and therefore, there are little case-specific drivers that could potentially affect the latter (see 
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Chapter 1.1 and Chapter 1.2). However, all of the observed UBC projects in R&D stem from 
some sort of market demand for better solutions. Moreover, all of the businesses reported 
that they would not have performed the project without the participation of the universities, 
which means that in order to meet the market demand for RDI that formulates in the 
preliminary phase, UBC in R&D is clearly needed. 
Moving on to the input phase, as it was specified within Chapter 1.2, the most critical driver 
was absorptive capacity, followed by earlier experience, institutional resources, and spill-
over rates. Since in minimum, all of the observed cases advanced from the preliminary phase 
to at least the input phase, it indicates that these organisations must have some level of 
absorptive capacity. Indeed, except Case 9 and Case 10 that did not have experience with 
UBC in R&D, all of the collaborating parties had specific employees that managed the R&D 
projects. Nevertheless, to save on cost, these employees were appointed on case-by-case 
basis, meaning that their daily work also included some other critical activities. 
With regard to earlier experience as another driver for the input phase, most of the 
organisations had several ongoing cooperation projects. However, four out of the eight 
businesses, and respectively one out of the eight university representatives that engaged in 
UBC were not aware of the number of their earlier collaboration projects. Yet, all of the 16 
interviewees responded that earlier results had created additional interest to engage in new 
collaboration. The latter was true even for the three cases that did not manage to proceed 
from the input phase. This clearly indicates that earlier collaboration is a significant driver of 
UBC in R&D, and it also supports the notion of cyclicality within UBC in R&D. 
Out of the collaborating cases, only the UT’s research group from Case 4 did not have earlier 
collaboration experience with businesses. This was apart from  the two cases that were found 
not to have contractual arrangements as means of collaboration with universities. With regard 
to Case 9 (Eolane Tallinn AS), their contact with universities was explicitly related to 
Mechanism 1 (training of human resources) and Mechanism 2 (social networks and informal 
contacts). Regarding Mechanism 3 (contractual arrangements), which is in the scope of this 
particular thesis (see also Chapter 1.1), Eolane Tallinn had not engaged in such cooperation. 
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The latter is partly related to the fact that the company provides sub-contracting services, and 
this does not require R&D. At the same time, even if the company wanted to perform R&D 
in collaboration with local universities, it could not do it due to the lack of universities’ 
expertise in electronics manufacturing. (Sogenbits 2014; Kerge 2014) Herein, also, the aim 
of this particular analysis was to assess the Estonian UBC in R&D. Thus, even if international 
collaboration could be considered possible in this case, it provides little input for this thesis. 
Regarding Case 10 (CrystalSpace OÜ), the company is a young spin-off from the ESTCube-
1 programme, established by three graduate students from the UT’s Institute of Computer 
Science. They already have the skills as well as the informal access to all the academic 
resources (including the research laboratories and scientists). Thus, while they pursue most 
of their R&D in-house and occasionally consult with the faculty informally, they do not need 
UBC in R&D through contractual arrangements (Viru 2014). Therefore, Case 10 stands out 
as an example that confirms the tendency of some researchers and enterprises preferring 
informal collaboration, if the level of trust is high enough as well as if the central goal is to 
occasionally exchange ideas and discuss possible means for resolving challenges (see also 
Chpt 1.2). Moreover, the spin-offs from universities could stand as separate 
commercialisation cases for universities, which does not necessarily follow the pattern of 
UBC in R&D (see also the Chapter 1.2 analysis regarding commercialisation strategies at the 
impact phase). 
While observing the motivation for starting the collaboration project, five of the eight cases 
pointed out that the business side initiated the cooperation. Two of the respective cases 
identified the university as the initiator. Most interestingly, within Case 3 (ME-3), both of 
the respondents identified themselves as the initiators of collaboration. Tere AS pointed out, 
that the company was actively looking for new solutions to differentiate their products from 
competitors (Reiman 2014). Similarly, the Department of Technology Transfer from the 
University of Tartu indicated that the university was seeking a commercial application for 
the newly discovered ME-3 bacteria (Saatre 2014). In a way, ME-3 represents a perfect match 
of university-business interests. Since ME-3 is one of the most successful examples of the 
UT’s research commercialisation cases (Toomla 2014), it could also indicate that perhaps the 
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greatest success drivers are among the cases at which both parties are simultaneously seeking 
to initiate cooperation. 
Next, six out of the eight observed cases reached the in-process phase, whereas three of the 
respective cases advanced to the impact phase, and two to the output phase. One project 
(HappyPregnancy) is still on-going with some mid-term results indicating that in minimum, 
the Output phase will be reached. Moreover, due to the high number of success drivers that 
have been identified for the HappyPregnancy project, it has favourable conditions to reach 
the impact phase. The latter is further elaborated towards the end of this chapter. Herein, the 
critical input phase drivers are further described. 
Also, the importance of aligning university-business interests is emphasised within all of the 
six observed cases. Indeed, while asking the interviewees, what were the main drivers that 
allowed to achieve the expected results, all of the representatives from the respective six 
cases mentioned some drivers related to the alignment of university-business interests. For 
example, Uusberg (2014) brought out that while starting the project, the “scope and the 
expected outcomes were clearly agreed upon“. Laan (2014) said that all of the collaborating 
parties “accounted for each-others’ interests from the very beginning,” and since most of the 
partners where acquainted, it was “easy to align our interests.” Reiman (2014) emphasized 
the shared vision and shared goals. Both Link (2013) and Mellik (2014) identified flexibility 
with accounting for partners’ interest. Flexibility was also mentioned by Voznessenskaya 
(2013) and Kasikov (2013) as well as Trei (2013) and Murutar (2013). This is in alignment 
with Chapter 1.2, which identifies that the ability to match univeristiy-business interests has 
a central importance within the input phase. 
With respect to the in-process and output phases, as specified in Chapter 1.2, the most critical 
success drivers are related to project management. Herein, although some of the observed 
projects did not proceed from the input phase, they still carried out preliminary collaboration 
projects, which allowed them to assess also the project management related drivers. As 
shown on the figure 8 below, Case 3, Case 5, and Case 6 that have reached the impact phase, 
posted the highest number of success drivers related to project management. Moreover, the 
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latter cases had almost no discrepancy between the responses of universities and businesses. 
This indicates that both parties understood the project in a similar manner. Briefly, both 
respondents of Case 6 (Language robot) reported all of the observed 15 success drivers for 
project management. In Case 3 (ME-3), both respondents reported 14 success drivers. In 
Case 5 (Implicit associations), 13 drivers were identified by the business representative, and 
14 drivers by the university representative. 
 
 
Figure 8. Number of identified project management related success drivers across cases out 
of 15 potential: the greatest number of success drivers represented in projects that have 
reached the impact phase. (Source: Constructed by the author). 
With regard to the three impact phase cases, most of the respondents stated that cooperation 
was well managed: responsibilities were clearly defined, end goals and milestones were 
realistic and well understood, there were adequate resources to complete the project, progress 
monitoring was implemented regularly, collaborators delivered their tasks on time, and 
communication occurred constantly. For example, Saatre (2013) said that the ME-3 project 
was exceptional, since information was exchanged rapidly, and progress was monitored on 
regular basis. For Case 6 (Language robot), Link (2013) and Mellik (2014) both provided a 
similar reasoning, while also emphasizing that their project was successfully broken down to 
well-managed sub-tasks. Uusberg (2014) agreed for Case 5 (Implicit associations) that the 
1
1
7
1
2
1
0
1
4
1
4
1
1
1
5
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
5
1
0
1
3
8
3
1 . 1 1 . 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 3 . 1 3 . 2 4 . 1 4 . 2 5 . 1 5 . 2 6 . 1 6 . 2 7 . 1 7 . 2 8 . 1 8 . 2
C A S E  1 C A S E  2 C A S E  3 C A S E  4 C A S E  5 C A S E  6 C A S E  7 C A S E  8
52 
 
project scope was concise enough for successful management. While Kustavus (2014) agreed 
as well, she also pointed out that there were several issues related to insufficient resources 
for performing the expected tasks. Nevertheless, since information was exchanged on 
frequent basis, these issues were promptly identified, and hence quickly resolved. 
At the same time, in cases that did not reach the impact phase, collaborators identified several 
weaknesses in project management. The lowest number as well as the greatest discrepancy 
of success drivers regarding project management was in Case 8 (3D modelling of Cumulus 
sailboat). The second lowest number of success drivers was in Case 1 (PDI 2). None of the 
latter cases reached the impact phase. For Case 8 that ended in the output phase, Trei (2013) 
emphasised the lack of sufficient communication with the business representatives. From the 
business perspective, Murutar (2013) pointed towards insufficient human resources to run a 
start-up, and simultaneously manage external cooperation. According to Murutar, the latter 
also caused their inability to manage cooperation on timely basis, which may indicate, that 
for start-ups, external resources would be needed to successfully manage collaboration 
projects. 
Likewise, Sirel (2014) from Case 7 (Smart grid development) pointed towards insufficient 
human resources to proactively manage cooperation next to other duties. Moreover, Sirel 
suggested that the shortage of human resources was one of the primary reasons for why the 
particular project has not yielded explicit commercial benefits yet. At the same time, the 
university representative of Case 7 considered the cooperation successful, since new 
knowledge was created regarding the smart grid networks that among other aspects, has also 
contributed to up to date field-specific teaching materials for students (Valtin 2014). This 
again proves that universities and businesses have different definitions for a successful 
project (see also Chapter 1.2). In this specific case, while the smart grid development indeed 
yielded a contribution to the scientific understanding of smart grid networks, the results did 
not enable Elektrilevi to use the project output in commercial applications. Yet, this was the 
initial motivation for launching the smart grid project on behalf of Elektrilevi (Sirel 2014). 
53 
 
For Cases 1 and 2 that did not proceed from the input phase, the issues related to project 
management were not that significant, since the preliminary projects that were conducted as 
part of the input phase, involved a narrower scope. For example, according to 
Voznessenskaya (2013), “although the university representatives completed their work with 
high quality, the company has not managed to come up with a standardized product.” 
Therefore, instead of seeking insufficiencies within project management, the company itself 
has not been successful in launching the R&D project for standardising the sub-components 
of PDI 2. Hence, although the university counterpart indeed emphasised that the 
communication has been insufficient (Kasikov 2013), the reasons are rather related to the 
lack of company’s financing opportunities for launching a full-scale cooperation 
(Voznessenskaya 2013). This shows that poor project management is not always the primary 
reason for unsuccessful UBC in R&D. 
Lacking a clear financing outlook was also mentioned in Case 2 as a primary reason for not 
entering into full-scale cooperation (Sülluste 2013). Nevertheless, the university and business 
counterparts have herein misunderstood each-other, since according to the company 
representative, there was a clear willingness to commit the necessary funding after the 
university proposed a clear budget and a project plan for IcePreventer’s development (Koit 
2013). However, the willingness to finance the project was not explicitly understood by the 
university counterpart. Instead, since KBFI assumed that there was not enough financial 
commitment by the company, they decided not to proceed with full-scale cooperation. Thus, 
although project management was not necessarily at the centre for Case 2, poor 
communication was indeed one of the reasons for not proceeding with the UBC project. 
With respect to project management related drivers that would enable the projects to reach 
the output phase, the level of bureaucracy stemming from public financing was mentioned in 
several interviews. For example, Laan (2014) discussed that several critical project activities 
were postponed and/or cancelled due to the complexity of reporting requirements imposed 
by the grant authority (Archimedes). Moreover, Laan (2014) also emphasised that while 
conducting the project, the project manager needs to excessively focus on administrative 
reporting requirements, despite the fact that there is an enormous amount of research needed 
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to be done apart from dealing with financing. One option would be to employ another team 
member that is responsible for the reporting, but in their case, there was not enough budget 
for the latter. Moreover, certain reporting could only be conducted by team members with 
in-depth understanding of the project. The latter indicates that reporting requirements 
imposed by public grants force researchers to shift their focus from R&D to dealing with the 
excess bureaucracy. Similar issues were also identified by Saatre (2014), Reiman (2014), 
Sülluste (2013), Voznessenskaya (2013), and Link (2013). 
Next, the UBC projects that have reached the impact phase should be considered to observe 
the drivers related to commercialisation. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to observe 
the commercialisation strategies on a detailed level. For that, another thesis should be 
constructed (see, for example, Toomla 2014, who analysed the commercial strategy for the 
University of Tartu). Nevertheless, it can be noted that for all of the cases that reached the 
impact phase, the UBC agreements also included a strategy for commercialisation from the 
very beginning of the cooperation project. However, it must be noted that the causality could 
also be interpreted somewhat differently: it could have been, that the for these specific 
projects, there was a more specific outlook for commercialisation, and thus, the 
commercialisation strategy was defined in more explicitly. 
Except for Case 8, the same cannot be noted for other UBC project in R&D that did not reach 
the impact phase. Also, with regard to most of the general success drivers that are relevant 
across the phases of UBC in R&D- university-industry specific issues; partner evaluation; 
‘culture gap’ management; universal success drivers; and outcome perspective (see also Chpt 
1.2) - the cases that have reached the impact phase have also most of the individual success 
drivers represented. For more details, see Appendix 3: breakdown of identified success 
drivers in specific categories relevant for all phases of UBC in R&D. 
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Figure 9. Total number of identified success drivers across the observed cooperation cases out of 
56 potential drivers (Source: constructed by the author). 
In general, as depicted on the figure above, projects that have reached the impact phase are 
closest to the maximum number of success drivers. Also, the discrepancy between the 
university-business responses of each specific case is greater for the cases that have not 
reached the impact phase, which indicates that contradictory viewpoints even with regard to 
some minor success drivers could risk the success of an UBC project in R&D. For example, 
in Case 1, which has reached the input phase, the business representative identified 41 
success drivers, whereas the university representative identified 31. The lowest number of 
success drivers was identified within Case 8 at which 36 drivers were identified by the 
business representative, and respectively 30 by the university representative. Case 8 reached 
an output phase, whereas an impact phase is not likely to be reached. 
At the same time, however, it must be noted that these assessments are based on qualitative 
methods. Therefore, while the tendencies of a greater number of success drivers seem to 
match with the UBC projects that indeed were successful, a more detailed interpretation 
would require that the cases are analysed in a more deeper level. This, however, can be done 
in later research building on the respective findings. 
4
1
3
1
3
0
3
6
5
0 5
1
4
9
5
3
4
3
4
9
4
9 5
0
4
3
4
7
3
6
3
0
1 . 1 1 . 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 3 . 1 3 . 2 4 . 1 4 . 2 5 . 1 5 . 2 6 . 1 6 . 2 7 . 1 7 . 2 8 . 1 8 . 2
C A S E  1 C A S E  2 C A S E  3 C A S E  4 C A S E  5 C A S E  6 C A S E  7 C A S E  8
56 
 
Lastly, as another overarching denominator, all of the cases, except Case 7 (Smart grid 
network), were co-financed by public grants. However, since Elektrilevi OÜ is a state owned 
enterprise, the latter case could be considered as partly state financed. Regardless, all in all, 
this supports the fact that Estonia currently does not have privately held R&D measures, nor 
will it likely develop such measures in the near-term future (Varblane et al 2012). While 
seeking the means to enhance Estonian UBC in R&D, it implies that state level policies will 
have a critical role in motivating universities and businesses towards further cooperation. 
Moreover, after the grant has been successfully used, and the impact phase has been reached, 
it is also more likely that the successful experience will incentives a continued cooperation 
based on privately funding (see also Chpt 1.1 and 1.2). All in all, the table below sums up the 
primary characteristics with respect to the observed UBC cases in R&D, and the related 
inferences for the Estonian UBC in R&D. 
Table 5. Conclusive overview of the findings regarding success drivers from each case, and 
inferences for the current state of the Estonian UBC in R&D 
Case  Overview of key findings Inferences for the Estonian 
UBC in R&D 
Case 1 (PDI 
2, Input 
phase) 
Cooperation has yielded preliminary results 
in terms of developing the needed 
components for PDI 2. However, lack of 
financing opportunities on behalf of the 
company holds back from entering full-scale 
cooperation. Has the third lowest number of 
success drivers reported by the university 
and the business representatives (31 and 41 
out of 56, respectively). 
Even if great applications could 
be developed, there is still a 
significant shortage of financing 
opportunities for entering into 
full-scale cooperation between 
universities and businesses. The 
primary shortfall is related to the 
gap between R&D and subsequent 
commercialisation:  current 
financing schemes assume that the 
company instantly reaches a high 
volume of sales after completing 
the project. Moreover, self-
financing rates assume that the 
company has considerable funds 
for investment. The latter, 
however, camnot the case in Case 
1, since the sales of 
interferometers require long and 
complicated procedures with a 
high fixed cost margin. 
Case 2 (Ice-
Preventer, 
Cooperation has not proceeded to the in-
process phase despite the willingness of the 
It was currently difficult to match 
university-business interests, 
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Case  Overview of key findings Inferences for the Estonian 
UBC in R&D 
Input 
phase) 
company to finance the necessary 
development. 
Research institute has not seen an outlook for 
sufficient financing nor has the company’s 
development idea directly been related to 
their research interests. Has one of the lowest 
number of success drivers with 36 reported 
by the university, and 30 reported by the 
business. The lowest category is partner 
evaluation related success drivers (only one 
out of nine drivers was detected by the 
business, and respectively six out of nine by 
the university- see also Appendix 3). 
since the operating principles as 
well as the expectations of either 
parties were disconnected. Thus, 
clearly, the main weakness related 
to relationship drivers. 
The availability of experienced 
cooperation facilitators that could 
contribute on project specific 
basis could be a solution to drive 
similar R&D projects.  
Case 3 
(ME-3, 
Impact 
phase) 
One of the most successful 
commercialisation cases for UT. The 
cooperation has yielded an economic impact 
on the university and the business. Both 
participants reported one of the highest 
number of success drivers: 50 and 51 out of 
56, respectively. 
ME-3 has a motivational impact, 
since proves that successful 
cooperation is indeed possible in 
Estonia. 
 
Case 4 
(Happy-
Pregnancy, 
In-process 
phase) 
Although the cooperation is still ongoing 
(the project is within the in-process phase), 
the achievement of some mid-term results 
indicates that the project has a high potential 
of reaching the impact phase. The latter is 
supported by the fact that cooperating parties 
also reported one of the highest number of 
success drivers in the sample: 53 and 49 out 
of 56 respectively by the university and the 
business. 
Could serve as a best practice 
example for performing 
successful UBC in R&D. 
Although there are numerous 
barriers to conducting this 
respective project, the fact that the 
vast majority of success drivers 
are represented provides a 
mechanism to overcome these 
barriers. 
Case 5 
(Implicit 
associ-
ations, 
Impact 
phase) 
A successful case that has reached the impact 
phase. The cooperating parties reported a 
relatively high number of success drivers (49 
by the university and 43 by the business out 
of 56). At the same time, it should be 
considered that the scope of this project was 
relatively smaller, which might imply that 
several major risk factors were avoided 
simply due to the smaller scale of 
cooperation. Also, it was conducted as a 
project for Master’s thesis, which added an 
additional incentive for the project manager 
to complete the project successfully. 
Moreover, university representatives 
managed to develop a tool for future analysis 
in similar projects, which increased his 
Collaboration projects will have a 
higher success rate, if there are 
additional incentives (e.g. earning 
a degree and/or developing tools 
for usage in other research 
projects) that drive the project 
managers. The latter can 
compensate for the lacking of 
otherwise critical success drivers. 
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Case  Overview of key findings Inferences for the Estonian 
UBC in R&D 
motivation to succesfully finalise the Implicit 
associations test. 
Case 6 
(Language 
robot, 
Impact 
phase) 
A successful case that has reached the impact 
phase. The cooperating parties reported one 
of the highest number of success drivers (50 
out of 56 by the university and 49 by the 
business). Currently, the Language robot 
trains border police and border patrol units in 
several European countries. From the 
business side, this has contributed to moving 
forward with developing similar cognitive 
learning technologies for the US market. 
Could be used as another best 
practice example for conducting 
successful UBC in R&D. 
Case 7 
(Smart grid 
develop-
ment, 
Output 
phase) 
Reached the output phase, but likely not to 
proceed to the impact phase. Has been 
successful from the university perspective, 
since contributed to fundamental knowledge, 
and allowed to generate teaching materials. 
From the business perspective, only 
conceptually successful, but has not yielded 
practical applications, and thus no 
commercial results. University reported 47 
out of 56 success drivers, the business 43. 
The indicated that there was a shortage of 
human resources to actively manage the 
project. Also, the initial task of the project 
was not explicit enough, which could be one 
of the key problems. 
Without sufficient human 
resources, UBC in R&D cannot 
be actively managed, and thus, the 
results will often not relate to 
what was initially intended. 
This is especially relevant in cases 
at which the initial task for 
cooperation has not been 
explicitly defined, and becomes 
clarified while already performing 
the cooperation. 
Case 8 (3D-
modelling, 
Output 
phase) 
Reached the output phase, but likely not to 
proceed to the impact phase. Has been 
successful from the university perspective, 
since the project manager performed the 
research as part of a Master’s Thesis. The 
cooperating parties reported one of the 
lowest number of success drivers: 30 out of 
56 by the university, 36 by the business. 
Collaboration projects will have a 
higher success rate, if there are 
additional incentives (e.g. earning 
a degree). Nevertheless, for 
companies at a start-up phase, it 
will still be difficult to 
commercialise the outcome even 
if the university manages to 
complete its part. 
Source: Constructed by the author. 
To sum up, this sub-chapter has analysed the current state of the Estonian UBC in R&D by 
observing the respective collaboration cases. While using the findings of this sub-chapter as 
an input, and coupling it with a broader understanding of the Estonian RDI system from 
Chapter 2.1, the following sub-chapter elaborates on the findings from a state perspective. 
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Specifically, based on the current collaboration experience, policy recommendations are 
provided to enhance UBC in R&D as a significant contributor to the Estonian RDI. 
2.3 Discussion and policy recommendations 
By now it should be clear, that Estonia needs to rapidly enhance UBC in R&D. Yet, although 
the need has been recognised, Estonia misses a structured understanding for how to construct 
effective policy measures, and in which context does UBC in R&D particularly lie with 
respect to the broader RDI system. Also, there is little understanding of the extent to which 
universities should engage in UBC in R&D, and whether additional competences along with 
new personnel, and perhaps even new academic institutions should be created for UBC in 
R&D. Moreover, from the business perspective, there is little understanding to how and for 
what purposes could universities become engaged for joint R&D initiatives, and at which 
point will it exactly be reasonable to encourage UBC in R&D. 
This thesis suggests that the cycle of UBC in R&D should be used as a basis for drafting 
these policy measures. Particularly, targeted policies should be drafted for each of the five 
phases of UBC in R&D (preliminary, input, in-process, output, and impact phases, 
respectively) with the final aim of driving most of the UBC projects in R&D towards the 
impact phase at which commercial benefits are achieved. Thus, this sub-chapter provides 
recommendations for designing policy measures to support UBC in R&D throughout these 
phases. While doing so, policy recommendations foremost relevant to individual phases will 
be outlined. Where applicable, general recommendations to enhance UBC in R&D are 
discussed as well. 
First, before moving any further, perhaps most importantly, state level strategic objectives 
along with priorities must be defined to specify the extent to which Estonian universities need 
to engage in UBC. After this, a strategy to embrace certain entrepreneurial principles can 
objectively emerge for leading universities. Such state level strategic objectives are foremost 
important, since universities must also continue to teach as well as conduct base science at a 
top quality (see also Chapter 1.1). Thus, although targeted policy measures such as state level 
orders for UBC projects in R&D (further discussed below) could serve as clear-cut means 
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for indeed enforcing the phenomenon of entrepreneurial universities, this is ought to be 
performed with a clear understanding of what is eventually needed. 
Without the latter, the state push towards entrepreneurial universities could in fact harm the 
ability of universities to perform their mission one- teaching- and mission two activities- 
research for base science (Knuuttila 2012), although so far, these risks have remained 
theoretical. Hence, after these priorities are defined, there will be a state level understanding 
of what to expect from UBC in R&D as a form of RDI. For example, this could be done in 
the form of an operational programme under the Estonian RDI strategy of 2014 – 2020, which 
has already identified university-business cooperation as one of the four critical means for 
achieving the 2020 objectives (see also Chapter 2.1). 
Moreover, after defining the strategic objectives, the state level operational programme could 
target the five phases of UBC in R&D as they have been specified within this respective 
thesis (see Chapter 1.1). Herein, the strategic policy actions for each of the respective phases 
could aim to enhance the success drivers of UBC in R&D as defined in Chapter 1.2, and as 
they were confirmed to be represented in successful collaboration cases among the Estonian 
universities and businesses (see Chapter 2.2). While building on the findings of the case 
studies and the theoretical analysis performed as part of the beforehand thesis, the following 
will propose some of the policy objectives that a similar state level operational programme 
could include with respect to each of the five phases of UBC in R&D. At the end of the 
chapter, table 6 outlines the policy recommendations in a conclusive manner. 
As described earlier, the preliminary phase is foremost related to the state level formation of 
the need for RDI (see Chapter 1.1). Thus, the Estonian policymakers first need to specify the 
means through which the state, universities and business can and should interact. An 
instrumental framework for such a specification could be the Triple Helix approach 
(Etzkowitz, Leydesdorff 2000). There are several examples of policy papers using the Triple 
Helix to specify innovation systems. For example, Lombardi et al (2011) proposed that the 
performance of smart cities could be assessed through an advanced Triple Helix model; 
Ranga et al (2008) used the Triple Helix framework to “enhance the innovation capacity of 
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small firms in the Northern Netherlands” (Ibid: 697); Fromhold-Eisebith (2011) has 
employed the Triple Helix approach to study the impact of UBC on a regional level within 
Eindhoven (The Netherlands), and Aachen (Germany). 
Herein, as described in Chapter 1.2, the absorptive capacity of collaborating parties is a 
critical driver for transitioning UBC in R&D from the preliminary phase to the input phase. 
To successfully enhance the absorptive capacity, state level policies should first become to 
understand the formation of the need for RDI. This can be done through employing the Triple 
Helix framework, which enables to specify the conditions that are ought to be met in order 
to reach Triple Helix III (see also Chapter 1.1). More specifically, the explicit 
interconnections and linkages between the respective institutions are ought to be mapped so 
that current interconnections could become understood. From such an understanding, 
targeted measures can be taken to optimise the interconnections, and to facilitate new 
overlapping relationships between universities and businesses.  
Depending on where exactly will the most critical shortages be identified, policy measures 
might include financing opportunities to build small in-house R&D departments for 
organisations that currently lack these features (would likely be a more costly measure than 
most of the other support schemes); or to generate support schemes for sub-contracting 
external R&D agents on case-by-case basis. This is supported by the findings from Chapter 
2.2: the observed organisations had at least one employee whose responsibility was to 
coordinate R&D projects. Secondly, there were mostly also external agents employed to 
improve the capacity for managing collaboration. And thirdly, policies should be designed 
to exchange the experience of successful cooperation cases. More specifically, since the 
successful cooperation cases clearly included a greater number of success drivers, the best 
practices are ought to be exchanged particularly on how to include as many success drivers 
as possible on project specific basis.  
Furthermore, state funded training opportunities are needed for organisations that do not have 
earlier experience with UBC in R&D. This is foremost relevant in order to increase the 
number of organisations that could enter the input phase. Currently, earlier collaboration 
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experience was found to be a significant driver of new cooperation projects. Yet, as 
elaborated in Chapter 2.1, only a handful of Estonian universities and businesses now have 
the cooperation experience: only an average of 3,9 Estonian scientists out of 30 engage in 
UBC (Davey et al 2011: 74). As  discussed above, these numbers are not much greater in 
other countries (for example, the same indicator is 4,4 out of 30 for Finland as well as the 
Netherlands), it is still problematic while aiming to enhance UBC in R&D. Nevertheless, if 
adequate training was available, the number of potential organisations conducting UBC in 
R&D could increase much faster. Moreover, as discussed above, if Estonia was to resolve 
this challenge faster than the developed economies, a significant competitive advantage could 
be reached for enervating economic convergence. 
Additionally, training should be coupled with networking opportunities to improve the 
informal ties that would both increase the pool of potential collaboration partners as well as 
to access tacit knowledge, which as discussed in Chapter 1.2, presumes that the potential 
partners are well acquainted. Only then can university-business interests become effectively 
matched, and subsequent inter-linkages inherent to Triple Helix III formulated. The latter 
was also proven by the case studies in which most of the successful projects had collaborating 
parties that previously knew each-other. Such acquaintances could be facilitating a series of 
state level matchmaking events with the clear purpose of introducing university and business 
representatives that operated within overlapping fields. For example, in the case of ME-3, 
the university and business representatives had their initial contact exactly in a similar event 
held at the University of Tartu.  
Moreover, as described in Chapter 1.2, matching the universities and business is not solely 
relevant in terms of networking, but also in terms of reaching suitable contractual 
arrangements. As one of the most explicit policy measures, the state level R&D financing 
opportunities could require that the projects financed through public grants should also entail 
UBC. So far, most of the Estonian R&D initiatives have included a public financing 
component (Varblane et al 2012: 10). Since this trend is likely to continue, the state level 
policies could also draft the terms so that UBC in R&D would become a prerequisite to state 
level financing for any research that includes a component of applied science. This approach 
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would generate a necessary driving mechanism for matching the university-business 
interests, since without the latter, there would be no state level funding for R&D. In fact, 
similar incentives have already been employed by other states: for example, the Netherlands 
does not have a single R&D measure solely for companies. Instead, it has grant opportunities 
available for R&D that include both universities and businesses as joint applicants (Varblane 
et al 2012: 12). 
An alternative would be to use tax incentives similarly to what has been discussed by Staehr 
et al (2010) as well as Kaarna (2010). However, any tax incentives would have to presume 
that first there is something to be taxed. They bring the example of income tax incentives for 
firms, which are only effective, if firms make a profit (Ibid: 3). Tax incentives to R&D should 
be viewed through a similar lens: since UBC in R&D is rarely exercised in Estonia, tax 
incentives will only have an effect on the organisations that already perform R&D. It will 
have little implications on driving additional organisations to enter into UBC in R&D. 
Moreover, since the Estonian companies are not taxed for reinvested profits, the potential 
benefits for using tax incentives will further lose justification. 
Instead, next to public grants for R&D, since most of the Estonian HEIs are public 
institutions, the state could motivate HEIs through directly targeted policies that favour UBC 
in R&D. For example, similarly to state level orders placed for a certain number of students 
within each field, there could be state level orders defined for UBC in R&D within fields that 
have the highest priority for R&D. Since there are not many of such Estonian companies, the 
effects would also be rather small. Nevertheless, it could become an explicit policy 
mechanism next to other measures that motivates the creation of Mode 2 universities 
(Knuuttila 2012, Etzkowiz 2004), which as shown in Chapter 1.2, are instrumental to driving 
UBC in R&D. This would clearly increase the number of university representatives seeking 
to enter into contractual arrangements, and therefore, it could operate as a catalyst for indeed 
intensifying UBC in R&D. 
Moving on to the in-process phase, policy measures for projects that already include 
contractual arrangements should foremost focus on the low level of success drivers. This can 
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be achieved by improving the project management skills of collaborating parties. Herein, the 
policies could aim to provide training for project management, and to exchange the best 
practices of projects that have successfully reached the impact phase. The latter need is 
supported by the case studies performed as part of this thesis: project management was 
generally found to be of high quality in the three cases that reached the impact phase. In other 
cases, at least one cooperating counterpart indicated that project management was rather 
poorly conducted (see also Chapter 2.2). However, if earlier training and experience sharing 
was more widespread, some of the mistakes could have been avoided. 
In addition, the quality of project management could also be improved by subcontracting 
experienced project managers. This again may be supported by the state level financing 
mechanisms so that the collaborating parties could focus on performing the key R&D 
activities, and not be stopped by the nuances of project management. As outlined in several 
cases in Chapter 2.2, the latter was clearly significant in order to save the much needed time 
solely for research itself. Moreover, if the state grants supported the hiring of an external 
project manager, this could also enable to involve top level experts and thus significantly 
increase the chances of a successful cooperation. 
Herein, although tax incentives, or some other regulatory measures might not be as effective 
for the preliminary nor the input phases of UBC in R&D, they could have a significant driving 
force for the in-process phase. With regard to tax opportunities particularly, as pointed by 
Staehr et al (2010), “R&D tax incentives can be regarded as effective as they entail some 
additionality, i.e. the incentives lead to added or increased R&D activity by the firms 
benefiting from the incentives.” (Ibid: 4). It implies that for already ongoing collaborations, 
tax incentives could generate an additional driver to enervate cooperation. 
From a slightly different perspective, a similar enabling mechanism can be achieved by 
minimizing the reporting requirements on public finances and improving the flexibility of 
the rules for using the grants while conducting R&D. As it was found for most of the observed 
cases, currently the bureaucracy related to public financing considerably restricts the 
flexibility of the R&D projects, and overly consumes the collaborators’ time on reporting to 
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the grant administrators. In order to improve the success of UBC in R&D, policymakers 
should focus on improving the flexibility of public financing so that the time spent on the 
actual R&D could be maximized. For example, in Case 2 (IcePreventer), it was indicated that 
some of the miscommunication between the university and business counterparts was due to 
the fact that the contract negotiations were performed simultaneously to preparing a grant 
application to finance the respective development. This prevented the academics from 
focusing on the actual details of the potential development, and forced to deal with the 
numerous regulatory limitations and restrictions that the possible grant application would 
have included. Moreover, it was indicated that since the business seemed to show interest for 
the collaboration solely in order to apply for the grant in cooperation with the university, it 
was unclear, whether the business was indeed interested in performing a full-scale 
development. Problems stemming from the regulatory and bureaucratic requirements were 
also identified in Case 1 (PDI 2), Case 3 (ME-3), Case 4 (HappyPregnancy), and Case 6 
(Language robot). 
Concerning the output and impact phases, state policies should likely be viewed under a 
common framework. As soon as the projects start to provide results, supporting the 
commercialisation of UBC in R&D should become the primary focus. Herein, evaluation 
criteria that expect the commercial outcomes should become more explicit. Currently, in 
many cases, the commercialisation requirements are rather lax within the project applications 
as well as within the contractual arrangements between the collaborating bodies. This is 
problematic, especially given that the university counterparts do not necessarily seek explicit 
commercial benefits from a UBC project in R&D (see Chpt 1.3). If, however, 
commercialisation was required to be at the core of a state funded UBC project in R&D, as 
well as if it was a strategic objective for the universities, it would also define the explicit end-
results in relation to the commercial goals. 
For the impact phase, the sole objective should be commercialisation through training 
opportunities and functional commercialisation strategies. For instance, Toomla (2014) has 
provided a comprehensive set of recommendations for universities. Specifically, he proposes 
that first, there should be a framework constructed for each project, followed by the strategy 
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for selling the IPR, and subsequently conducting the sales as specified by the respective 
strategy (Ibid: 60). From the perspective of businesses, although there lacks a comparable 
study on Estonia, similar measures should be implemented. All in all, the table 6 below 
provides a conclusive overview of the proposed phase-specific policy recommendations to 
enhance UBC in R&D. 
 
Table 6. Phase-specific policy recommendations to enhance UBC in R&D 
Phase 
Recommendations 
Objective Proposed policy measures 
Preliminary 
phase 
Define the state level strategic 
objectives and related 
priorities to enhance UBC in 
R&D 
Generate an operational programme underneath 
the national RDI strategy for 2014 – 2020 in 
which university-business collaboration has 
been defined as one of the four key strategic 
channels for achieving the Estonian RDI 
objectives by 2020. Ensure that the operational 
programme includes clearly outline 
responsibilities, attributed resources, and 
deadlines for completing specific activities. Use 
the five phases of UBC in R&D as well as the 
critical success drivers for each phase as basis 
for defining the strategic objectives as well as 
guidelines for drafting the operational 
programme. 
Specify on a detailed level, 
how the state-university-
industry interactions impact 
national innovation systems. 
Employ the Triple Helix framework to specify 
major linkages and interconnections between 
the Estonian universities and businesses. Use 
the specification as an input for policies that 
would enhance the Estonian UBC in R&D. 
Based on the earlier 
specification, provide well-
structured incentives to 
stimulate the formation of the 
underlying demand for RDI 
through UBC in R&D. 
Initiate public-private partnerships and provide 
financing incentives for businesses and 
universities in order to draw attention to 
meeting the market demand through UBC in 
R&D. 
Input phase 
Improve the absorptive 
capacity of businesses and 
universities. 
Modify RDI financing so that UBC in R&D 
would become a prerequisite to receiving state 
level grants. 
Provide financing to improve R&D capacity 
through external measures (e.g. sub-contracting 
on project-specific basis). Estonia should 
consider more elaborate bridge financing 
opportunities as well as the availability of 
external cooperation facilitators to drive R&D 
projects. 
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Phase 
Recommendations 
Objective Proposed policy measures 
 
Provide access to training on R&D as well as 
collaboration management. 
Improve semi-formal 
connections between 
university and business 
representatives. 
Initiate major networking events with the 
purpose of matching university and business 
representatives. 
 
Cooperation facilitators should be directed to 
review successful projects, and the ways that 
success drivers were ensured. 
In-process 
phase 
Match university-business 
interests. 
Improve access to financing opportunities. 
Create state level incentives for UBC in R&D 
through HEI policies. 
Maximise collaboration 
efficiency. 
Improve the project management capacity and 
skills: provide training for project management; 
exchange best practices. 
Provide tax incentives and minimize 
bureaucracy stemming from the reporting 
requirements for public financing. 
Output 
phase 
Increase the number of 
projects that reach the output 
phase, and at the same time, 
are likely to proceed to the 
impact phase. 
Improve project management and draft 
evaluation criteria that assume the later stage 
commercialisation of the output. Also, define 
commercialisation as a strategic objective for 
universities along with a specific prioritisation 
and an accompanied operational programme for 
achieving these respective results. 
Impact 
phase 
Increase the share of 
commercialised projects. 
Provide training opportunities on drafting 
commercialisation strategies. 
Source: Constructed by the author. 
In conclusion, this sub-chapter has provided policy recommendations for enhancing the 
Estonian UBC in R&D. As it was shown above, this includes a series of targeted steps that 
should be taken at a state level. First, the state level strategic objectives and priorities are 
ought to be defined in order to specific the expectations for the extent to which UBC in R&D 
is ought to be developed. This in turn will formulate the basis for drafting a state level 
operational programme. As discussed above, since the national RDI strategy 2014 – 2020 
already identifies university-business cooperation as one of the four critical means of 
achieving the objectives by 2020, the operational program could be drafted under the 
framework of the respective strategies. Herein, as a structured basis of the operational 
programme, the five phases of UBC in R&D could be used as defined by the beforehand 
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thesis. Moreover, facilitating the emergence of the success drivers for UBC in R&D could 
be the central goal of most of the policy actions taken as such a programme. Also, the explicit 
recommendations for targeted policies to support each phase of UBC in R&D could be used 
as an input for drafting such a programme. 
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SUMMARY 
Although UBC in R&D has a high potential for contributing to national RDI, and thereon to function 
as an internal growth driver, there is still little idea of how to enhance UBC in R&D, and what methods 
should exactly be used for assessing its current state.  Thus, to specify the analysis, the theoretical 
part of the thesis captures the cooperation through five phases of collaboration: preliminary phase at 
which the need for RDI is being formulated; input phase, which stands for semi-formal university-
business interactions; in-process phase that stands for the formal execution of UBC in R&D; output 
phase that represents the achievement of end results of UBC in R&D as defined in contractual 
arrangements; and the impact phase, which stands for the commercial benefits of respective 
collaboration. The reasoning was to capture UBC in R&D from a state perspective, and to 
subsequently define the key drivers that contribute to successful collaboration. After defining the key 
drivers, assessment methods were analysed. 
Within the preliminary phase, the most functional method to analyse the asymmetries of an innovation 
system, and to understand the formation of the need for RDI, is to employ the Triple Helix theory. 
Particularly, the greater Triple Helix stage at which an economy lies, the greater are the interactions 
between the universities, state, and businesses. This in turn implies, that the need for intellectual 
capital production will be processed in a more effective manner, and the economy as a whole, will 
better manage to indeed satisfy the need of intellectual capital production. Thus, economies closer to 
Triple Heilx III, which stands for trilateral networks, and hybrid organisations, have the greatest 
likelihood of employing UBC in R&D for RDI. 
At the input phase, partnerships are formulated to respond to the underlying need of intellectual 
capital production. Herein, this includes unofficial interactions as well as possible feasibility studies 
/ pre-assessments prior to entering into full-scale cooperation. At this stage, again, the Triple Helix 
theory provides the best framework for analysing the level of interactions between universities and 
businesses. Briefly, economies at Triple Helix III have greater interconnections between the two 
parties, which also implies, that the input phase has a greater likelihood of being completed. 
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Moreover, states’ level of economic development is ought to be considered, while analysing the input 
phase of UBC in R&D. In advanced countries, university-industry links are varied, which implies 
that the patterns of UBC in R&D are formalised, and thus, the input phase functions in a more 
systematic manner. However, in catching up economies, university-industry links have not been 
formalised, and therefore, the UBC in R&D occurs in a laissez fare manner. In turn, this implies that 
state level incentives are critical for enhancing the success of UBC in R&D, since without the latter, 
the input phase will not become completed. 
Next, within the in-process phase, partnerships have already become formulated, and therefore, the 
cooperation occurs mostly under specified contractual arrangements. This is the phase at which 
formal execution of UBC in R&D occurs, and thus, most of its significant denominators are rather 
low level. Herein, the in-process phase is largely captured by the organisations’ willingness to engage 
external counterparts for performing R&D. Such practices are widely spread in industries under rapid 
transformation, as well as in the small economies, that lack the internal resources to finance large 
scale in-house R&D. At the same time, it must also be noted, that similar strategies are acknowledged 
by numerous large corporations in ICT, engineering, pharmaceuticals, etc. In fact, it has largely been 
recognised, that the most effective R&D can be performed through UBC in R&D. 
Projects that reach the output phase have mostly fulfilled the contractual obligations, and thus, a result 
of the cooperation can be reported. However, it does not necessarily mean that commercial benefits 
have been reached. Instead, projects in the output phase have rather develop new technologies, and/or 
the project team has achieved a new set of skills. For individual UBC projects in R&D, these outputs 
may indeed imply that cooperation has been successful. Nevertheless, from a state level perspective, 
toasssess the success of intellectual capital production via UBC in R&D; the commercial impact is 
also ought to be considered. 
Thus, within the impact phase, clear-cut commercial impacts will be reached as a result of certain 
UBC projects in R&D. Such impacts may occur in the form of increased revenue or improved 
profitability of the firms and universities that are related to the cooperation. On the one hand, this 
might seem like elf-evident. Nevertheless, in cases where public financing is involved with UBC 
projects in R&D, the commercial benefits are not always granted. Often times, projects tend not to 
have explicit commercialisation goals linked to the cooperation agreements. Therefore, to avoid these 
risks, the impact phase should be separately scrutinized, and the drivers relevant for maximizing the 
commercial benefits of intellectual capital production via UBC in R&D should be better understood. 
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More specifically, with regard to the critical success drivers of UBC in R&D, these should be analysed 
in the context of the above specified cooperation phases. Indeed, there are some overarching success 
drivers that are relevant for all of the five cooperation phases: university-industry specific issues; 
partner evaluation factors; managing the “Culture Gap;” universal success factors; and collaboration 
outcome perspectives as the low-level drivers. Market demand for RDI; regulatory incentives; and 
macroeconomic conditions as the high-level drivers). However, the critical success drivers are 
foremost related to each of the respective phases. 
First, for the preliminary phase, the critical success driver is the absorptive capacity for intellectual 
capital production. Specifically, companies with internal R&D departments, and universities have 
technology transfer units, or similar functions, are more likely to pass the preliminary phase as they 
are capable of processing the needs for RDI. Thus, part of a solution for enhancing the absorptive 
capacity could be to set up small in-house R&D departments, which would then coordinate external 
R&D collaboration. Although the in-house department would lack resources to perform independent 
R&D, the driving force of intellectual capital production would still reside within the organisation. 
As shown by this thesis, such a strategy is not solely limited to smaller organisations, but it could also 
be adapted by large multinationals, academic institutions as well as part of wider state level innovation 
systems. 
Second, for proceeding from the input phase, the critical success driver is the ability to combine 
university-business interests. For businesses, the input phase drivers mostly relate to a reasonable 
outlook to resolve the underlying need via UBC in R&D. Specifically, motivation relates to the firms’ 
understanding of whether knowledge from universities could complement the firms’ business 
interests. From the universities’ perspective, in order to understand the interest, a distinction should 
be drawn between the theoretical types of institutions (Mode 1) versus the entrepreneurial universities 
(Mode 2). Although both types of institutions are needed for the sake of scientific advancement, it is 
clear that Mode 2 universities will be more likely to contribute to matching the university-business 
interests, and thus complete the input phase. 
 Third, low-level relationship and project management drivers are critical for both the in-process as 
well as the output phase. These include mutual trust; commitment; a shared goal; understanding of 
common interest by different stakeholders; prior relations with the business partner; and cooperation 
as effective means to address societal challenges and issues. For business drivers, these include 
employment by business of (former) Higher Education Institution (hereinafter HEI) staff and 
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students; interest of business in accessing scientific knowledge; possibility of accessing 
funding / financial resources for working with business; short geographical distance of the 
HEI from the business partner; flexibility of business partner; access to business-sector 
research and development facilities; and commercial orientation of the HEI. The in-process 
and output phase include a similar set of critical success drivers, since mostly universities 
and businesses will only enter contractual arrangements with confidence in their capability 
to meet the terms of the respective contract. Therefore, with respect to the particular drivers 
related to the outcome phase, these are foremost related to the project-specific terms. 
Fourth, with respect to the drivers related to the impact phase, these mostly relateto the viability of 
commercialisation strategies. For example, a relevant factor for the commercialisation strategy 
could be the existence of a clearly specified process for commercialising a UBC project in 
R&D. From the university’s point of view, this starts with adopting a knowledge 
commercialisation mission next to the traditional academic missions of teaching and 
scientific discover. At the same time, for both the businesses as well as the universities, one 
of the most successful methods is to have clearly defined processes along with critical 
resources and well-equipped partners for each respective phase of the commercialisation 
process. 
Next, with respect to the possible assessment methods, researchers on UBC in R&D have 
still not reached an agreement on commonly accepted methods. Nevertheless, at a state level 
assessment, the intensity as well as standardisation of university-business-industry 
interactions should first be determined. In developed economies, the interconnections are 
more standardised and straightforward, which enables to better employ quantitative 
assessment methods. In catching up economies, interconnections are yet to be formulated, 
which means that the qualitative approaches allow to draw inferences with greater 
explanatory power. In addition, the most recent research has become to recognise to view bot 
the perspectives of universities and businesses under a common framework. The latter is 
relevant in order to avoid potential biases from analysis on solely universities or businesses. 
At the second chapter of the thesis, an assessment of the Estonian UBC in R&D was carried 
out. Specifically, the current state of the Estonian UBC in R&D was analysed in the context 
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of the broader RDI system as well as through eight case studies that observed specific 
collaboration cases. For the latter, in depth interviews were conducted both with university 
and business representatives from the observed cases. Based on the assessment, policy 
recommendations were provided for enhancing the Estonian UBC in R&D. 
Although in the context of other catching up economies, the Estonian innovation system has 
been performing rather well, the economy is still an innovation follower rather than a leader. 
Moreover, the UBC in R&D has a low contribution to the Estonian RDI. Recently, this has 
become recognised by the leading Estonian scholars on innovation, who have also proposed 
that for the national RDI strategy of 2014 – 2020, UBC could be one of the means for 
achieving its strategic objectives. However, first, the rate of successful cooperation projects 
that result in commercial benefits is ought to be significantly increased. Therefore, while 
analysing the current state of the Estonian UBC in R&D via case studies, the relevant 
conclusions with regard to the observed success drivers are as follows: 
 The Estonian UBC projects in R&D that have reached the impact phase have a high 
level of success drivers represented from both the university as well as the business 
perspectives. Therefore, to enhance UBC in R&D, focusing on the success drivers 
could be an effective approach. In total, earlier literature has identified approximately 
56 separate drivers that could all potentially be relevant for a successful collaboration 
project; 
 For projects that did not proceed from the input phase, either misalignments in 
communication or the shortage on financing opportunities was detected. At the same 
time, for most of the projects that proceeded from the input phase, the latter shortfalls 
were not detected. Thus, to match university-business interests within the input phase, 
this might imply that means for more targeted financing opportunities should be 
considered as well as opportunities to improve the semi-formal communication while 
preparing the full-scale cooperation; 
 Projects that already entered the in-process phase, also reached at least the output 
phase. However, projects that did not proceed to the impact phase were missing a 
clear-cut commercialisation strategy. Also, a shortage of human resources along with 
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poor project management as well as a lack of conciseness within the initial task for 
UBC in R&D were identified. In turn, projects that did reach the impact phase, mostly 
reported that necessary resources were present, project management was performed 
successfully, and the tasks for each collaborating party were well understood. In 
addition, there were clear agreements on the commercialisation principles after the 
R&D has been completed. Herein, while aiming to enhance the Estonian UBC in 
R&D, the latter findings again support that the success drivers should receive the 
greatest prirority. 
Briefly, based on the research findings, the following policy recommendations were provided 
to enhance the Estonian UBC in R&D: 
 Generate an operational programme underneath the national RDI strategy for 2014 – 
2020 in which university-business collaboration has been defined as one of the four 
key strategic channels for achieving the Estonian RDI objectives by 2020. Ensure that 
the operational programme includes clearly outline responsibilities, attributed 
resources, and deadlines for completing specific activities. 
 Employ the Triple Helix framework to specify major linkages and interconnections 
between the Estonian universities and businesses. Use the specification as an input 
for policies that would enhance the Estonian UBC in R&D. 
 Initiate public-private partnerships and provide financing incentives for businesses 
and universities in order to draw attention to meeting the market demand through 
UBC in R&D. 
 Modify RDI financing so that UBC in R&D would become a prerequisite to receiving 
state level grants. 
 Provide financing to improve R&D capacity through external measures (e.g. sub-
contracting on project-specific basis). Estonia should consider more elaborate 
bridge financing opportunities as well as the availability of external cooperation 
facilitators to drive R&D projects. 
 Provide access to training on R&D as well as collaboration management. 
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 Initiate major networking events with the purpose of matching university and 
business representatives. 
 Create state level incentives for UBC in R&D through HEI policies. 
 Improve the project management capacity and skills: provide training for project 
management; exchange best practices. 
 Provide tax incentives and minimize bureaucracy stemming from the reporting 
requirements for public financing. 
 Improve project management and draft evaluation criteria that assume the later stage 
commercialisation of the output. Define commercialisation as the strategic objective 
for businesses along with a specific prioritisation and an accompanied operational 
programme for achieving these respective results. 
 Provide training opportunities and sharing of best practices on drafting 
commercialisation strategies. 
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APPENDIXES  
Appendix 1. The interview questionnaires 
 Question Type of question 
Current situation 
1 How many product or service development projects has 
your company executed within the past five years? 
Clarificatory probe (are they active 
within R&D at all?) 
2 Within the past five years, have you done preparations to 
start (a) cooperation project(s) with universities? If yes, 
then how many? 
Clarificatory probe (are there 
cooperation projects to talk about?) 
3 If you answered “yes” to question nr. 2, then how many 
of the cooperation projects proceeded to the execution 
phase? 
Clarificatory probe (is there actual 
experience with execution?) 
4 If you answered “yes” to question nr. 2, then how many 
of the cooperation projects’ results have a commercial 
potential? 
Clarificatory probe (do some of the 
cooperation projects comply with the 
thesis’ definition on productive UBC in 
R&D? See also chpt 1.1) 
5 Who is involved in your company’s R&D projects? Who 
is responsible for what? 
Clarificatory probe (are there right 
people in charge of R&D?)  
Preparing the cooperation project: Please select an example of a recent cooperation project that 
managed to reach commercial outcomes (positive example) / did not reach such outcomes (negative 
example) 
6 What was the motivation to start the cooperation 
project? 
Explanatory probe (see, if the initial 
motivation is comparable across 
projects?) 
7 Did you have previous connections with the university / 
faculty that you cooperated with? 
Explanatory probe (test drivers: 
university-industry specific issues) 
8 During the project preparation, who did you mainly 
communicate with from the university / faculty? Why 
exactly that person? 
Exploratory probe (test drivers: 
university-industry specific issues) 
9 Who initiated the cooperation? Your company or the 
university? 
Clarificatory probe (see, if comparable 
across projects?) 
10 What goals did you set for the cooperation project prior 
to starting? 
Exploratory probe (test drivers: Project 
Management) 
11 What division of roles did you agree upon between the 
university and company representatives?  
Exploratory probe (test drivers: Project 
Management) 
12 Did you also sign an agreement that specified the 
expected results of the cooperation project? Did you 
reach the expected results? 
Exploratory probe (test drivers: 
Outcome perspectives) 
13 If you answered ‘yes’ to question 12, then what were the 
main drivers from your company’s side that indeed 
allowed to reach the results as agreed upon in the 
contract? 
Amplifying probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
14 If you answered ‘yes’ to question 12, then what were the 
main drivers from the university’s side that indeed 
allowed to reach the results as agreed in the contract? 
Amplifying probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
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15 Have the achieved results created additional interest in 
starting new cooperation projects with the same partner? 
If yes, then what projects? 
Exploratory probe  (test, if the cycle of 
UBC in R&D is driven by earlier 
positive results) 
16 Have the achieved results created additional interest in 
starting new cooperation projects with other partners? If 
yes, then in what projects? 
Exploratory probe (test, if positive 
results induce other cooperation in 
R&D) 
Initiating and defining objectives for the cooperation project 
17 What was your initial interest to participate in the 
cooperation project? 
Explanatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
18 What was universities’ initial interest to participate in 
the cooperation project? 
Explanatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
19 Please point out the positive aspects from the 
cooperation project 
Amplificatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
20 Please point out the negative aspects from the 
cooperation project 
Amplificatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
21 Had you initially known what you know now, would 
you still be interested in starting the cooperation? Please 
elaborate. 
Amplificatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
22 If the university’s representatives knew what they know 
now, what do you think, would they be interested in 
starting the cooperation? Please elaborate. 
Amplificatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
23 What were the primary drivers for success (in case of a 
positive example) / causes of failure (in case of a 
negative example) 
Amplificatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
Execution and results of the cooperation project 
24 Who lead the cooperation? Was it your company or the 
university? 
Exploratory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
25 How would you describe the role of your company 
throughout the cooperation process? 
Amplificatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
26 How would you describe the role of the university 
throughout the cooperation process? 
Amplificatory probe (test drivers: could 
fall under any category) 
27 Had you not cooperated with the university, would you 
have reached comparable results? 
Explanatory probe (test, if UBC in 
R&D has been a unique path towards 
intellectual capital production) 
28 If you answered ‘yes’ to the previous question, then why 
did you still prefer to cooperate with the university? 
Amplificatory probe (test, if UBC in 
R&D has been a unique path towards 
intellectual capital production) 
29 The following lists a set of drivers that could potentially be significant for executing a 
successful cooperation project. Please indicate, whether these drivers were represented at your 
cooperation project (Yes/No). Please elaborate, if needed. 
Nr Driver Represented? Comment: pos / 
neutral / neg 
University - industry specific issues 
1 Prior relation with the university representatives   
2 Role of Lead Researchers   
3 Involvement of post-graduate students   
4 Employment by business of (former) HEI staff and 
students 
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5 Interest of business accessing scientific knowledge   
6 Interest of universities accessing business’ scientific 
knowledge 
  
7 University’s possibility of accessing funding / financial 
resources for working with business 
  
8 Possibility of business for accessing additional financing 
(e.g. state financing) 
  
9 Short geographical distance of the HEI from the 
business partner 
  
Partner evaluation factors Represented? Comment: pos / 
neutral / neg 
10 Compability of culture / mode of operation   
11 Complementary expertise / strengths   
12 Past collaboration partners   
13 Partners’ high quality of knowledge and skills   
14 Shared vision of the project’s end-results   
15 Shared vision of the project’s strategic importance   
16 Complementary aims   
17 No hidden agendas   
18 Partner’s cooperation experience with companies   
Project Management Represented? Comment: pos / 
neutral / neg 
19 Project management training   
20 Diplomacy   
21 Multifunctional experience   
22 Clearly defined objectives   
23 Clearly defined responsibilities   
24 Mutually agreed project plan   
25 Realistic end goals   
26 Realistic milestones   
27 Adequate Human Resources for achieving the 
milestones and end-goals 
  
28 Adequate financial resources for achieving the 
milestones and end-goals 
  
29 Other adequate resources   
30 Simple collaborative agreement   
31 Regular progress monitoring   
32 Effective communication   
33 Ensuring collaborators deliver   
Managing the “Culture Gap” Represented? Comment: pos / 
neutral / neg 
34 Ability to match the differing priorities / timescales of 
academia and business 
  
35 Publishing in public domain   
36 Academic laissez-faire approach   
37 IPR and confidentiality   
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Universal success factors Represented? Comment: pos / 
neutral / neg 
38 Mutual trust   
39 Continuity   
40 Commitment   
41 Learning ability   
42 Flexibility of cooperation partners   
43 Business’ Leadership   
44 University’s Leadership   
45 Good personal relationships   
46 Image of a collaboration champion from the business’ 
side 
  
47 Image of a collaboration champion from the university’s 
side 
  
Outcome perspectives Represented?  
48 Commercial benefit for the business   
49 Commercial benefit for the university   
50 Continued support for the business’ related R&D 
programs 
  
51 Continued support for the university’s related R&D 
programs 
  
52 Technological innovation   
53 Publishing opportunities   
54 Patents / IPR   
55 Compatibility with student projects   
56 Student recruitment   
Source: constructed by the author. 
Overview of the modifications to the interview script for universities (as compared to the 
business’ interview script) 
 
 Not modified 
 Modified 
No U B No U B No U B No U B No U B No U B 
Unstructured questions Structured questions 
1   16   1   16   31   46   
2   17   2   17   32   47   
3   18   3   18   33   48   
4   19   4   19   34   49   
5   20   5   20   35   50   
6   21   6   21   36   51   
7   22   7   22   37   52   
8   23   8   23   38   53   
9   24   9   24   39   54   
10   25   10   25   40   55   
11   26   11   26   41   56   
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12   27   12   27   42    
13   28   13   28   43   
14   29   14   29   44   
15      15   30   45   
Source: Constructed by the author. 
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Appendix 2. List of interviewees 
Number Name (Position, Organisation) 
1.1 Maria Voznessenskaya (CMO, VTT-NTM OÜ) 
1.2 Arne Kasikov (Researcher; Institute of Physics, University of Tartu) 
2.1 Marek Koit (Member of Board; Üle OÜ) 
2.2 Kristian Sülluste (R&D coordinator; Keemilise ja Bioloogilise Füüsika 
Instituut) 
3.1 Mare Reiman (Head of product development; Tere AS) 
3.2 Jane Saatre (Intellectual Property Manager, University of Tartu) 
4.1 Kristian Ratnik (Laboratory specialist; Quattromed HTI Laborid OÜ) 
4.2 Prof. Maris Laan (Professor of  Human Molecular Genetics; Institute of 
Molecular and Cell Biology, University of Tarty) 
5.1 Karin Kustavus (Product Manager; Põltsamaa Felix AS) 
5.2 Andero Uusberg (Researcher; Institute of Psychology, University of Tartu) 
6.1 Andres Mellik (CEO; JukuLab OÜ) 
6.2 Marek Link (Head of Innovative Learning Technology Center; Estonian 
Academy of Security Sciencies) 
7.1 Margus Sirel (Head of the Strategic Planning Department for Asset 
Management; Elektrilevi OÜ) 
7.2 Prof. Juhan Valtin (Associate Professor; Department of Electrical Power 
Engineering, Tallinn University of Technology) 
8.1 Richard Murutar (CEO; BoatArt OÜ) 
8.2 Tuuli Trei (Project Manager; Estonian Academy of Arts) 
9.1 Emöke Sogenbits (CEO; Eolane Tallinn); Sixten Kerge (Quality Manager; 
Eolane Tallinn) 
10.1 Jaan Viru (CEO, CrystalSpace) 
Source: constructed by the author 
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Appendix 3. Break-down of identified success drivers in specific categories relevant for all 
phases of UBC in R&D. 
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RESÜMEE 
 
Ülikoolide-ettevõtete koostöö teadus- ja arendustegevuses: Eesti majanduse 
kasutamata võimalus 
Üks tõhusamaid mooduseid, teostamaks teadus- ja arendus- ning innovatsioonitegevust 
(edaspidi TAI-d) võiks olla läbi eduka ülikoolide-ettevõtete teadus- ja arenduskoostöö 
(edaspidi ÜEK TjaA). Viimane on eriti tõusnud päevakorda väikestes järgijõudvates 
majandustes nagu Eesti, mis peavad konvergentsi lõpetamiseks kasvama kiiremini kui 
arenenud majandused. Sellest hoolimata käsitletakse ÜEK TjaA-d endiselt tihti kitsa 
uurimisvaldkonnana, mille potentsiaali majanduskasvu edendamisele kiputakse alahindama. 
Olgugi et mõned neoliberaalse majanduskoolkonna pooldajad võivad väita, et konvergents 
toimub vääramatu jõuna, on niisugune lähenemine siiski liiga lihtsustatud. Näiteks 
Schumpeteri poolendogeenne kasvumudel tõestab, et majanduskasv sõltub suuresti ka riigi 
enda võimekusest toota ja kommertsialiseerida intellektuaalset kapitali. Viimane omakorda 
sõltub riigi edukusest majanduskasvu saavutamisel läbi TAI rakendamise. Muu hulgas on 
vastav käsitlus järgijõudvatele majandustele oluline nt keskmise sissetuleku lõksu 
vältimiseks: nt Eestil on hetkel selge risk jääda sissetuleku lõksu juhul, kui ei suudeta 
rakendada sisemisi ressursse majanduskasvu kiirendamiseks. ÜEK TjaA-s võiks siinjuures 
olla üks võimalustest, mille kaudu võiks panustada Eesti TAI arendamisse ja seeläbi 
majanduskasvu kiirendamisse. 
Sarnase väljakutsega seisvad silmitsi pea kõik riigid. Samas, lahendis tuleb igal riigil leida 
individuaalselt. Intellektuaalse kapitali loomet ega laiemat TAI rakendamisvõimekust ei saa 
riiki importida sarnaselt mõningate teiste majanduskasvu stiimulitega nagu nt 
välisinvesteeringute kaasamine, mujal arendatud tehnoloogiate rakendamine jne. Kuigi teiste 
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riikide praktikast saab õppida, siis ilmselgelt peab iga riik siiski iseseisvalt leidma parimad 
moodused nii TAI teostamiseks kui selle raames ka ÜEK TjaA edukuse tõstmiseks. 
Siinjuures, olgugi et vastav tõdemus on tänaseks laialt aktsepteeritud, puudub nii Eesti 
poliitikutel, ettevõtetel kui ka teadlastel selge nägemus, kuidas siiski edendada Eesti ÜEK 
TjaA-d. Seetõttu on käesoleva magistritöö eesmärk analüüsida hetkeolukorda Eesti ÜEK 
TjaA-s ning pakkuda poliitikasoovitusi koostöö tõhustamiseks. Täitmaks töö eesmärki, on 
autor sõnastanud järgmised uurimisülesanded: 
 Analüüsida ülikoolide-ettevõtete TjaA koostöö võtmeprotsesse, lähtuvalt riigi 
tasandist; 
 Analüüsida ülikoolide-ettevõtete TjaA koostöö peamisi edutegureid; 
 Analüüsida, kuidas hinnata ülikoolide-ettevõtete TjaA koostööd; 
 Analüüsida Eesti TAI süsteemi, kirjeldada uurimistöö valimit ning metoodikat; 
 Hinnata Eesti ülikoolide-ettevõtete TjaA koostöö hetke olukorda, 
 Pakkuda poliitikasoovitusi Eesti ülikoolide-ettevõtete TjaA koostöö tõhustamiseks. 
Uurimustöö metoodika tugineb juhtumianalüüsidel, mis vaatlevad konkreetseid ÜEK TjaA 
projekte. Informatsiooni kogumine toimus poolstruktureeritud intervjuude käigus. Kokku 
vaatles autor kaheksat koostööjuhtumit. Iga juhtumi raames intervjueeris autor eraldi nii 
ettevõtte kui ka ülikooli esindajaid. 
Töö teoreetiline baas tugines ÜEK TjaA protsessi analüüsimisel läbi viie etapi: koostöö 
esmane faas (TAI vajaduse formuleerumine); sisendfaas (poolametlik ÜEK); protsessi faas 
(ametlik ÜEK TjaA teostamine); väljundfaas (ÜEK TjaA tulemus); mõju faas 
(kommertsmõju). Iga faasi raames analüüsis autor esmalt kriitilise tähtsusega nüansse, mis 
on vajalikud koostöö olemuse mõistmiseks vastavates faasides. Seejärel analüüsis autor 
edutegureid, mis tagavad koostööprojektide liikumise eelnevast etapist järgmisesse. 
Viimasena analüüsis autor töö teoreetilises osas võimalikke ÜEK TjaA 
hindamismetoodikaid. 
TAI vajaduse formuleerimise kirjeldamiseks esmases faasis kasutati Kolmikspiraali teooriat. 
Täpsemalt, vastav teooria loob funktsionaalse raamistiku riigi, ülikoolide ning ettevõtete 
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omavaheliste suhete kirjeldamiseks. Majandust, mis on Kolmikspiraali I astmes, 
iseloomustab ettevõtete-ülikoolide täielik eraldatus. Niisugune etapp on valdavalt esindatud 
autoritaarsetes ühiskondades ning vastavates oludes on tõenäosus ÜEK TjaA rakendamiseks 
suhteliselt madal. Kolmikspiraali II astmes on tegu laissez fare lähenemisega: ülikoolide-
ettevõtete koostööks puuduvad otsesed takistused. Samas pole ka süsteemseid meetmeid, mis 
niisugust koostööd soodustaksid. Kolmikspiraali III aste on seevastu ülikoolide-ettevõtete 
koostööks oluliselt soodsam: organisatsioonide vahel eksisteerivad trilateraalsed võigustikud 
ning kattuvad juhtimisahelad. Majandustel, mis on lähemal kolmikspiraali III astmele, on 
suurim tõenäosus rakendada TAI teostamiseks ÜEK TjaA-d. 
Järgmiseks, sisendfaas on partnerlussuhete kujunemise etapiks. Siinkohal võib koostöö 
toimida nii mitteametliku suhtluse kui ka esmaste tasuvus- ja eelanalüüside kaudu. Vastava 
etapi käsitlemiseks loob samuti parima raamistiku Kolmikspiraali teooria: taaskord, 
majandused, mis on lähemal Kolmikspiraali III astmele, omavad tugevaimaid seoseid 
ülikoolide ja ettevõtete vahel, mistõttu toimuvad vajalikud koostööd ettevalmistavad 
suhtlused oluliselt intensiivsemalt ja enamate organisatsioonide vahel. Veelgi enam, 
siinkohal tuleb eristada riikide majanduslikku arengutaset. Arenenud majandustes, kus on 
tihedad sidemeed ülikoolide-ettevõtete vahel, on vastavatel organisatsioonidel ühtlasi 
formeerunud täpsemad koostööpõhimõtted ja -praktikad. Seetõttu on oluliselt lihtsam jõuda 
koostöökokkulepeteni. Samas, järgijõudvates majandustes, mis on enamasti endiselt 
Kolmikspiraali II astmes (laissez fare lähenemine), on ülikoolide-ettevõtete sidemed oluliselt 
väiksemad. Seetõttu puuduvad ka väljakujunenud praktikad ÜEK TjaA teostamiseks. 
Niisugustel juhtudel on ühtlasi käesolevas töös näidatud, et vastavad sidemed ei tugevne 
iseenesest. Sestap on olulised riiklikul tasemel välja kujundatud poliitikameetmed, mis 
soodustaksid vastavate koostöösidemete väljakujunemist. 
Protsessi faasis on partnerlussuhted täpsustunud ja koostööd tehakse enamasti ametlike 
lepingute alusel. Seega toimub antud faasis ametlik ÜEK TjaA elluviimine, mistõttu tuleb 
siinkohal eelkõige vaadelda ÜEK TjaA-d madalal projektide elluviimise tasemel. Protsessi 
faasi mõistmiseks tuleks eelkõige analüüsida, mis määratleb nii ülikoolide kui ka ettevõtete 
huvi koostöös osalemiseks. Siinjuures on üheks olulisimaks muutujaks organisatsioonide 
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valmidus teostada TjaA-d ühes teiste ettevõtete ja ülikoolidega. Niisugune valmidus on 
eelkõige täheldatav tööstusharudes, mis on läbi tegemas kiireid muutusi (nt IKT, 
nanotehnoloogia, biotehnoloogia jne), kuid nt ka väikestes majandustes, millel puuduvad 
sisemised ressursid TjaA teostamiseks ainult süsteemi siseselt. Samas tuleb rõhutada, et 
sarnast TjaA strateegiat rakendavad arvuakad rahvusvahelised korporatsioonid ja ka suured 
arenenud majandused. Viimane näitab, et avatud koostöö, sh ÜEK TjaA-s, on üks 
optimaalsemaid viise protsessifaasi läbimiseks. 
Projektid, mis jõuavad väljundfaasi, on enamasti täitnud osapoolte vahel sõlmitud 
kokkulepped. Samas, nagu käesolevas töös välja toodud, siis viimane ei tähenda tingimata, 
et koostöökokkulepete täitmine tähendaks tingimata kommertsialiseeritavate tulemusteni 
jõudmist. Selle asemel võib ÜEK TjaA tulemusena olla nt välja arendatud uus tehnoloogia 
või koostöö osapooled võivad olla omandanud uusi teadmisi-oskusi. Üksikute 
koostööprojektide tasemel võib niisuguste tulemusteni jõudmist justkui käsitleda eduna. 
Samas, rahvamajanduse perspektiivist ei ole ÜEK TjaA edukas enne, kui ei ole jõutud 
kommertsialiseeritavate tulemusteni. 
Seetõttu on autor käsitlenud väljundfaasi järgselt veel eraldi ka mõjufaasi kui etappi, kuhu 
jõuavad kommertsialiseeritud ÜEK projektid TjaA-s. Niisugune mõju võib nt tähendada, et 
ÜEK TjaA tulemusena on kasvanud märgatavalt koostööd teinud osapoolte müügitulu või 
on paranenud kasumlikkus. Üheltpoolt, niisugune käsitlus võib mõjuda ilmselge ja mõneti 
lihtsakoelisena. Samas, nagu autor on käesolevas töös näidanud, siis juhtudel, kus ÜEK 
TjaA-d viiakse ellu avaliku rahastuse kaasfinantseerimisel, ei ole kommertsialiseeritavate 
tulemusteni jõudmine alati eesmärgiks, sest koostöö tegemist peetakse juba iseenesest heaks 
tulemuseks. Sestap, vältimaks niisuguseid riske, tuleks mõjufaasi siiski käsitleda ÜEK TjaA 
osana ning eraldivõetuna väljundfaasist. Ühtlasi, vaadeldes kriitilisi tegureid, mis 
soodustavad eduka ÜEK TjaA teostamist, tuleks eelkõige käsitleda edutegureid, mis selgelt 
panustavad kommertsialiseeritavate tulemusteni jõudmisse. 
Täpsemalt, autor on käesolevas töös analüüsinud kriitilisi edutegureid ÜEK TjaA 
teostamiseks vastavate eespool kirjeldatud koostööprotsessi etappide lõikes. Siinkohal, 
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eksisteerivad ka protsessietappide ülesed edutegurid. Nt koostööprojektide tasandil on 
käesolevas töös välja toodud partneri hinnangu faktorid; ülikoolide-ettevõtete profiilide 
eripärast tulenevad tegurid; toimetulek „kultuurilõhega;“ universaalsed edutegurid; ja 
koostöö tulemuste väljavaade. Ühtlasi, kõrgemal rahvamajanduse tasandil on faasiüleste 
eduteguritena välja toodud turu nõudlus TAI järgi; regulatiivsed tegurid; ning 
makromajanduslikud tingimused. Teisalt, kriitilised edutegurid on valdavalt siiski seotud 
konkreetsete koostööprotsessi etappidega, mistõttu tuleks neid käsitleda ka vastavas 
kontekstis. 
Esmases faasis on kriitiliseks eduteguriks intellektuaalse kapitali absorbeerimisvõime. 
Täpsemalt, majandused, kus ettevõtetel on sisemised TjaA osakonnad ning ülikoolidel on 
väljakujunenud tehnoloogia ülekande praktikad, liiguvad suurema tõenäosusega esmasest 
koostöö faasist edasi sisendfaasi. Käesolevas töös on näidatud, et viimane on eelkõige tõsi, 
kuivõrd organisatsioonid on niisugustel juhtudel oluliselt võimekamad TAI vajaduste 
mõistmiseks ning vastavatele vajadusetele reageerimiseks. Seetõttu, tõhustamaks ÜEK 
TjaA-d, peaks esmalt keskenduma organisatsioonide absorbeerimisvõime kasvatamisele. 
Viimane ei tähenda siiski, et organisatsioonidesse peaks tekkima täiemahuline TjaA 
võimekus. Eelkõige on vajalik kriitilise võimekuse loomine, kuivõrd täiemahulise TjaA 
teostamine saab toimida organisatsioonide ülese koostööna. Nagu käesolevas töös näidatud, 
siis niisugune strateegia ei ole omane ainult väikestele organisatsioonidele. Vastupidi, suured 
rahvusvahelised korporatsioonid ning tugevad majandused on samuti selgelt liikumas 
organisatsioonide ülese koostöö, sh ÜEK TjaA, soodustamise kui tõhusaima TjaA 
elluviimise lahenduse suunas. 
Teiseks, sisendfaasist edasiliikumiseks on käesolevas töös tuvastatud kriitilise edutegurina 
ülikoolide-ettevõtete huvide ühildamist. Ettevõtete perspektiivis on eelkõige oluline mõista, 
kuidas toetab ÜEK TjaA-s viimaste huve. Täpsemalt, eelkõige on ettevõtetele oluline, kas 
ülikoolide teadmised ja oskused võiks panustada viimaste ärihuvide edendamisse. Samas, 
ülikoolide perspektiivis on eelkõige oluline eristada teoreetilist tüüpi institutsioonide (Mood 
1) ning ettevõtlikku tüüpi ülikoolide (Mood 2) vahel. Kuigi mõlemat tüüpi ülikoolid on 
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kahtlemata vajalikud teadusliku töö edendamiseks, on selge, et ülikoolide-ettevõtete huvide 
ühildamine saab edukalt toimuda eelkõige Mood 2 tüüpi ülikoolide kontekstis. 
Kolmandaks, töö autor on tuvastanud, et protsessi ning väljundfaasides on kriitiliste 
eduteguritena eelkõige oluline projektijuhtimisega seonduv. Siinjuures on olulised 
märksõnad nagu koostööd tegevate osapoolte usaldus, pühendumine, jagatud eesmärgid ja 
huvid erinevate osapoolte vahel, eelnevad suhted koostööpartnerite vahel jne. Täiendavalt 
võivad olulised olla nt akadeemilise personali ja tudengite palkamisvõimalused, ettevõtete 
huvi ülikooli teadmiste vastu ning vastupidi, võimalus täiendavaks rahastuseks, väike 
geograafiline vahemaa, koostööpartnerite paindlikkus jne. 
Neljandaks, mõjufaasiga seonduvad kriitilised edutegurid on eelkõige seotud ÜEK TjaA 
kommertsialiseerimisstrateegiate olemasolu ning jätkusuutlikkusega. Nagu eespoolt lühidalt 
kirjeldatud, siis ülikooli vaatenurgast algab see eelkõige Mood 2 tüüpi missiooni 
tähtsustamisest lisaks traditsioonilisele hariduse andmisele ning alusteaduse tegemisele. 
Samas, nii ülikooli kui ka ettevõtte kontekstis on siinkohal eelkõige oluline omada selgelt 
defineeritud ülevaadet kõigist koostööprotsessi etappidest kuni kommertsialiseerimiseni: sh 
oodatavad tulemused, seonduvad tegevused, vajalikud ressursid ning sobivad partnerid 
kommertsialiseerimisprotsessi elluviimiseks. 
Täiendavalt, teadlaste hulgas puudub üldtunnustatud kokkulepe, millise metoodika alusel 
ÜEK T&A-d riiklikul tasemel hinnata. Siinjuures, autor on käesolevas magistritöös 
analüüsinud nii võimalikke kvalitatiivseid kui ka kvantitatiivseid uurimismeetodeid. 
Lühidalt, töös on välja toodud, et sobiva meetodi väljatöötamisel tuleb esmalt arvestada 
hinnatava majanduse arengutasemega: mida arenenum majandus, seda suurema 
tõenäosusega saab ÜEK-s täheldada standardiseeritud koostöösidemeid. Viimasel juhul võib 
olla põhjendatud kvantitatiivsete meetodite eelistamine. Samas, järgijõudvates majandustes, 
kus ÜEK koostööpraktikad ning sidemed organisatsioonide vahel on juhuslikud, saab 
kvalitatiivsete meetoditega olukorda täpsemalt hinnata. Ühtlasi, tagamaks objektiivsust, on 
hiljutised teadustööd järjest enam tähtsustanud üheaegselt nii ülikoolide kui ka ettevõtete 
analüüsimist. 
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Töö empiirilises osas teostas autor Eesti ÜEK TjaA hetke olukorra hindamise ning tõi välja 
poliitikasoovitused ÜEK TjaA tõhustamiseks. Siinjuures analüüsis autor esmalt Eesti ÜEK 
TjaA-d laiemalt, vaadeldes Eesti TAI strateegiat perioodiks 2014 – 2020 ning ÜEK TjaA 
rolli TAI süsteemi kontekstis. Seejärel analüüsis autor Eesti olukorda kitsamalt, teostades 
kaheksa juhtumianalüüsi.  Vastavad analüüsid keskendusid konkreetsetele Eestis ellu viidud 
koostööprojektidele. Iga juhtumi raames teostati poolstruktureeritud süvaintervjuud eraldi nii 
ettevõtte kui ka ülikooli esindajatega. Seejärel, töö tulemuste baasilt töötati viimases osas 
välja politiikasoovitused Eesti ÜEK TjaA tõhustamiseks. 
Lühidalt, kuigi teiste järgijõudvate majanduste võrdluses on Eesti innovatsioonisüsteem 
suhteliselt edasiarenenud tasemel, on riik siiski endiselt veel innovatsioonijärgijate 
kategoorias. Samas, enamus arenenud majandustest klassifitseeruvad innovatsiooniliidriteks, 
mis viitab, et vastavatele majandustele järgi jõudmiseks tuleks ka Eestil siiski saavutada 
innovatsiooniliidri staatus. Siinkohal, Eesti ÜEK TjaA-l on selgelt suurem potentsiaal Eesti 
TAI süsteemi panustamiseks, kui seni on suudetud ära kasutada. Seda on ka arvesse võetud 
Eesti TAI strateegia 2014 – 2020 koostamisel, kus ülikoolide-ettevõtete koostöö on toodud 
välja kui üks neljast strateegilisest kanalist majanduslike eesmärkide saavutamiseks. Viimase 
tõhustamiseks peaks esmalt suurendama kommertsialiseeritavate tulemusteni jõudvate 
koostööprojektide arvu. Sestap, kasutades juhtumianalüüsi Eesti ÜEK TjaA hetke olukorra 
analüüsimiseks, jõudis autor järgmiste tulemusteni: 
 Eesti ÜEK TjaA projektides, mis on jõudnud mõjufaasi, on ühtlasi esindatud suurim 
arv käesolevas töös vaadeldud eduteguritest. Seetõttu kinnitavad edukad 
koostööprojektid, et tõhustamaks Eesti ÜEK TjaAd, tuleks eelkõige keskenduda 
edutegurite soodustamisele; 
 Projektidel, mis ei jõudnud sisendfaasist edasi, oli probleeme eelkõige 
kommunikatsiooniga ettevõtete ning ülikoolide vahel ja/või sobivate 
rahastusvõimaluste leidmisega. Kuivõrd sisendfaasis on kriitiliseks eduteguriks 
ülikoolide-ettevõtete huvide ühildamine, siis on eespool loetletud takistused 
ootuspärased. Sestap, tagamaks koostööprojektide liikumist sisendfaasist 
protsessifaasi, tuleks eelkõige keskenduda just soodustada huvide lahendamist läbi 
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ettevõtete-ülikoolide kommunikatsiooni soodustamise ning suunatud 
rahastusmeetmete väljatöötamise; 
 Sisendfaasi jõudnud projektid jõuavad valdavalt ka väljundfaasi. Samas, projektid, 
mis ei edenenud mõjufaasi, ei omanud konkreetset kommertsialiseerimisstrateegiat. 
Teisalt, mõjufaasi jõudnud projektidel võis täheldada nii kommertsialiseerimisega 
seonduvate väljavaadete kui ka täpsemate kokkulepete olemasolu. Ühtlasi, mitmetel 
projektidel oli probleemiks vähene inimressursi olemasolu ja/või ebamääraselt 
sõnastatud lähteülesanne koostööprojekti teostamiseks. Teisalt, projektid, mis 
jõudsid mõjufaasi, ühtlasi raporteerisid valdavalt, et esindatud oli nii piisavad 
inimressursid kui ka selgelt sõnastatud lähteülesanne. Ühtlasi, projektijuhtimine oli 
mõjufaasi jõudnud projektidel teostatud oskuslikult, samas kui väljundfaasis 
lõppenud koostööprojektide puhul oli projektijuhtimise edutegureid vähem 
esindatud. Niisiis, tõhustamaks ÜEK TjaA-d, on käesolev töö autori hinnangul 
kinnitanud, et edutegurite soodustamine võiks olla üks tulemuslikumaid lähenemisi. 
Lühidalt, tuginedes käesoleva töö tulemustele, võiksid olla välja toodud järgmised 
poliitikasoovitused: 
 Arvestades ÜEK TjaA tähtsust Eesti TAI 2014 – 2020 strateegia kontekstis, tuleks 
välja töötada ÜEK TjaA edendamise rakenduskava. 
 Tuleks luua täpne ülevaade Eesti ülikoolide-ettevõtete praegustest koostöösidemest, 
andmaks võimalikult täpset sisendit ÜEK TjaA-d edendavate poliitikameetmete 
täpsemaks kujundamiseks. Siinjuures oleks soovituslik lähtuda Kolmikspiraali 
teooria poolt defineeritud raamistikust ettevõtete-ülikoolide-riigiasutuste vaheliste 
suhete kirjeldamiseks. 
 Luua rahastusmeetmeid, mis motiveeriksid ülikoole ettevõtetega senisest enam 
koostööd tegema: üks võimalik lahendus oleks sarnaselt õppekohtade rahastamise 
süsteemile, siduda ülikoolide-ettevõtete koostöö riiklike tellimustega. Teisalt, 
ettevõtetele täiendavate võimaluste loomisel tuleks kaaluda võimalikke 
maksusoodustusi ning TjaA rahastusmeetmetid, mis eeldavad koostööd ülikoolidega. 
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 Luua ettevõtetele ja ülikoolidele täiendavaid koolitus- ja treeningvõimalusi TjaA 
koostöö teostamiseks. Ühtlasi oleks üheks võimaluseks luua võimalusi parimate 
praktikate vahetamiseks tänaseks juba mõjufaasi jõudnud koostööprojektide näitel. 
 Tõhustada riiklikke toetusmeetmeid organisatsiooniväliste TjaA töötajate 
kaasamiseks. Ühtlasi, pakkuda projektijuhtimise koolitusi ning siduda riiklike 
rahastusmeetmete nõuded konkreetsemalt kommertsialiseerimisvõimekusega. 
Kokkuvõttes, Eesti ülikoolide-ettevõtete koostöö potentsiaal TjaA-s on selgelt 
alarakendatud. Samas, kuivõrd Eesti on järgijõudev majandus, mis peab pidevalt kasvama 
kiiremini kui arenenud majandused, siis niisuguse võimaluse kasutamata jätmine ei ole 
põhjendatud. Sestap on antud töö tulemusena pakutud välja, et konstruktiivseim lähenemine 
oleks keskenduda ÜEK TjaA eduteguritele. Niisuguse tulemuse saavutamiseks peaks 
poliitikameetmed adresseerima igat koostööprotsessi etappi: vastavaid etappe puudutavad 
peamised poliitikasoovitused on käesoleva töö tulemusena ka välja toodud. 
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